



War, forced displacement and
responses to the crisis in Cabo Delgado
Mozambique



Report of
Ayuda en Acción

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Introduction and context of the study

Since October 2017, the province of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, has been whipped by the phenomenon of armed violence. As a result, 946,508 people have been displaced to the southern region of the province and other areas of the country as of June 2022¹ and there have been 4,398 fatalities².

Among the causes of violence that have been pointed out are: religious conflicts between Islamic confessions, interests over land and natural resources in the area, the presence of large extractive projects (with the largest investment in the history of Southern Africa in the Rovuma Basin gas extraction project), poverty and inequality, illicit trafficking of drugs, ivory and precious stones, among others.

Cabo Delgado province has historically boasted some of the lowest development indices in Mozambique. The illiteracy rate is 53%, the life expectancy rate stands at 48

years³ and the average monthly expenditure per person in 2015 was €34⁴.

The Fundación Ayuda en Acción (AeA) has been working directly in Cabo Delgado since 2006. Since 2019, it has been working in response to the Internal Displaced People (IDP) crisis with programs in the areas of shelter, protection, camp management and water and basic sanitation from an emergency approach to cover basic needs. In addition to the emergency response to the IDP crisis, Fundación Ayuda en Acción works in the generation of economic opportunities and education with interventions in the host areas.

For more than 5 years, Gernika Gogoratuz (GgG) and the Center of Studies and Action for Peace (CEAP) have been developing a research-action-participation process in northern Mozambique within the framework of the Territories in Conflict project, in order to build an action plan for peace and

1. IOM (2022): Displacement Tracking Matrix. Baseline Assessment Round 16 - (May-June 2022).

2. ACLED (2022): Cabo Ligado Weekly: 31 October - 6 November.

3. MASC (2021): Malamulelo. Suplemento Cabo Delgado.

4. INE (2015): Relatorio final do Inquerito ao Orcamento Familiar - IOF - 2014/15. Maputo.



coexistence in Cabo Delgado led by the displaced communities.

This report joins other initiatives and research carried out by GgG, CEAP and AeA, which aim to make a critical and constructive contribution to the analysis of the armed conflict and the response. The three organizations assume that a deeper understanding of the reality of Cabo Delgado is necessary to advance the improvement of the situation of the people affected by this war requires complex analyses, the incorporation of approaches that reveal the inadequacies of current development, humanitarian and military operations, and that promote the participation and strengthening of the agency of the displaced communities and the inhabitants of Cabo Delgado.

The study aims to deepen local knowledge and understanding of the context, capacities and strategies of actors and institutions, as well as the processes of forced internal displacement in the province of Cabo Delgado.

We understand forced internal displacement from a paradigm that recognizes the complexity of these phenomena, understanding the difficulties that displaced populations experience from a processual perspective that integrates the different phases of displacement (departure, arrival and integration/return) and attending to the displaced not only as victims but also as active agents with their experiences, capacities and expectations that outline their survival and integration strategies in contexts characterized by their complexity and high rates of scarcity of resources for their integration.

We believe it is important to pay attention not only to the displaced population. The host communities, given the pre-existing conditions of poverty and the lack of infrastructure and basic services, are an important key. Their social support capacity is a fundamental element, so interventions must have a holistic scope: on the one hand, addressing the needs of the displaced and, on the other, increasing the availability of and access to essential goods and services in the host communities.

At the moment, much of the burden of the IDP crisis is being sustained from the community, a community with precarious initial conditions

Local social support networks (kinship, religion, ethnicity, origin, profession, neighborhood, etc.) sustain most of the displaced populations in Cabo Delgado. At the moment, much of the burden of the IDP crisis is being sustained from the community, a community with precarious initial conditions that, with the arrival of the displaced, sees its existing situation of poverty increase, introducing important factors of social tension, which, therefore, can provoke conflicts and the rupture of these networks, deepening the crisis and provoking violent incidents when they are not adequately addressed.

In addition to the international conventions and legal figures that define the displaced person as a subject of law, we understand that the figure of the displaced person should be understood, following Refslund Sorensen⁵, from an approach of agency and capabilities based on the following premises:

- The importance of not only explaining 'why' and 'how' IDP populations got to

5. Refslund Sorensen, Birgite, 2003: Researching internal displacement: what is our field and what is our goal? Trondheim Conference, Norway.

their current state, but also asking 'what's next?'

- The heterogeneity of populations with different identities and positions that is obscured by the homogeneous category of 'internally displaced persons'.
- The displaced, like all other social groups, consider their options and act strategically to achieve their individual objectives.
- IDPs are not necessarily rooted at home: many want to move to other places, other possibilities and new lives.

Our intervention strategy must be sensitive to local contexts from the point of view of the forced displacement process. To this end, the identification of the profile of internally displaced persons and social support networks, as well as their identification and the social mechanisms operating within them, are fundamental elements.

People forced to flee from violence carry an experience marked by the fact of forced displacement. It is important to understand



their lives from a processual perspective, in constant change and the ways in which memory operates on them, generating adaptive responses to new situations, and how it acts on their expectations for the future. The displaced person constructs new worlds of life based on memory, tradition and their capacities. Displacement is a traumatic moment of experience and constitutes a frame of reference to reorganize and reinterpret their history, culture, society and identity in a broad sense.

The protracted war and humanitarian response have brought to the table the debate on how to move forward with a triple nexus approach that synchronizes humanitarian, development and peace initiatives to reduce the vulnerabilities of internally displaced persons, while ending direct violence by armed groups, initiating post-war reconstruction and strengthening community cohesion among displaced and host communities. With this research, from a knowledge based on the local context and the interpretation of the diverse social realities, using feminist, decolonial and critical political economy theoretical-analytical tools, the aim is to focus on the need to change

course, taking into account the explanations, narratives and proposals based on the knowledge and experiences of the affected people, and orienting humanitarian aid, development and peace initiatives towards strengthening the agency of the networks of displaced communities and host populations.

In order to carry out the study, an interdisciplinary work team of women and men, both local and international, was formed with the objective not only to collect information, but also to generate internal and external debates and reflections that would allow a systemic and processual understanding of the complexity of the current reality in Cabo Delgado, also involving the displaced communities and inhabitants of the area in the process of peace-building in their own territory.

We propose feminist research from the epistemologies of the South (Santos, 2019⁶ ; Cunha & Casimiro, 2019⁷), based on a

6. Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (2019): *O fim do império cognitivo. A afirmação das epistemologias do sul*. Coimbra: Almedina.

7. Cunha, Teresa & Casimiro, Isabel (2019): "Epistemologías del sur y alternativas feministas de vida" en Jokin

capabilities approach (Dubois, 2019)⁸, which bets on the participatory construction of peace (Ramos, 2019)⁹. It aims to be a critical work, which delves into an understanding of the complexity of the current reality of northern Mozambique, of the conflicts and situations of violence that are causing forced displacement, with the ultimate purpose of generating creative, viable and locally appropriate proposals that facilitate both the processes of reception and humanitarian response, as well as lasting solutions that enhance the capacities of the populations of Cabo Delgado. To this end, it is essential to consider people's idiosyncrasies, expectations and culture. It is essential to generate spaces for projective and proactive conversations between the affected communities and the rest of the actors to define concrete initiatives for their well-being and for peace, and to try to put an end to the current dependencies and submissions.

In order to find ways to respond to what is happening in Cabo Delgado, it is not enough to rhetorically appeal to humanitarianism and human rights or to

articulate sophisticated and costly military and humanitarian responses. This is not enough to put an end to the violence and, consequently, the rights of displaced persons are not being sufficiently guaranteed. Other knowledge and knowledges and other ways of doing science can provide new keys to move forward, paying attention to the events that precede, accompany and follow displacement¹⁰, as a process and life experience. An attentive, open and agile approach is required, which not only seeks to identify gaps, but also to give an active voice to the protagonists, transcending unilinear formulas of response to the crisis, in favor of reflexive mechanisms where, in the first instance, it is necessary to understand what people do and what they want. Displaced persons and host communities are agents who respond on the basis of inherited ways of being and being in the world, built interactively throughout their experience, and who act creatively, moving in worlds of life, adapting and generating strategies for building the future¹¹.

The artisanal feeling-doing-knowledge of women proposed by Teresa Cunha (2022)¹²

Alberdi et al: Territorios en Conflicto. Claves para la construcción de alternativas de vida. Gernika-Lumo: Gernika Gogoratuz. 71-118.

8. Dubois, Alfonso (2019): "La propuesta alternativa desde el enfoque de las capacidades. Conceptos y marco de análisis", en Jokin Alberdi et al: Territorios en Conflicto. Claves para la construcción de alternativas de vida. Gernika-Lumo: Gernika Gogoratuz. 25-69.

9. Ramos, Muslera Esteban (2019), "Praxis participativa de la paz transformadora: teoría y método", en Pérez de Armiño, Karlos y Zirion, Iker (coord.): Pax Crítica. Aportes teóricos a las perspectivas de paz posliberal. España, Editorial Tecnos.

10. Marx, Emanuel (1990): "The social world of refugees: a conceptual framework". Journal of Refugee Studies. Vol. 3, nº 3.

11. Vincent, Marc y Refslund Sorensen, Birgitte (ed.), (2001): Caught between borders. Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced. Londres: Pluto Press.

12. Cunha, Teresa (2021): "Sentir-Pensar-Hacer Feminista: Reflexiones. Huellas hacia un pluriverso feminista: Reflexiones Metodológicas para la Práxis" en Liliana Zambrano & Itxaso Bengoetxea (coord.): Metodologías para la construcción de Alternativas de Vida. Gernika-Lumo: Gernika Gogoratuz. 34-51

and the moral imagination as the art and soul for peacebuilding by John Paul Lederach (2007)¹³, suggest using micropolitics (Cusicanquí, 2018)¹⁴ of everyday life, the artisanal, intuition and the creative potential of community and social plurality to carry out successful peace-building processes. Connecting the structural dimension of conflicts with the everyday expectations of ordinary people may be one of the keys to advance social and political changes.

The experience of more than 5 years of constant research in Cabo Delgado by Gernika Gogoratuz and the 16 years of work of the Fundación Ayuda en Acción, as well as the continuous work since 2018 with displaced populations, aid agencies, international organizations and government bodies, have been essential elements for the configuration and implementation of the study and data collection, including a set of diagnoses carried out on the populations with whom we work in different areas. Additionally, in order to know first-hand how the emergency caused by the war in Cabo Delgado is being faced, in addition to interviewing experts, humanitarian workers and political authorities, we have mainly chosen to rely on the life stories of displaced families through questionnaires-dialogues¹⁵,

13. Lederach, John Paul (2007): *La imaginación moral. El arte y el alma de la construcción da paz*. Bakeaz. Gernika Gogoratuz.

14. Cusicanquí, Silvia Rivera (2018): *Um mundo ch'ixi es posible. Ensayos desde um presente em crisis*. Buenos Aires: Tinta Limón.

15. Surveys-dialogue were conducted with 8 displaced

in order to learn from the resilience and resistance of these groups that we tend to marginalize.

With this methodological strategy we wanted to start from the deconstruction of our cultural automatisms or, as Dipesh Chakrabarty¹⁶ would say, "provincialize" our Eurocentric knowledge, to bet on creating, nurturing and strengthening horizontal dialogues between marginalized and privileged knowledge and agents, which will help us learn from the community and thus transcend institutionalized forms. In this sense, we tried to distinguish between the personal experiences of the research team and the needs and expectations of the families interviewed, in order to then move forward in the complicated task of taking what we learned to the spaces of power. Even so, it must be recognized that these alternative methodologies are still extractive, and hardly provide a return on the studies for the communities that have participated in them. Aware of this, and without raising false expectations, we do believe that we can transmit the commitment that together we can change for the better some of the decisions that affect them.

families from the neighborhoods of Mahate, Josina Machel and Paquitequete in the city of Pemba, and in the displaced people's camps of Nacate and Mapupulo in Montepuez and Natove in Ancuabe. In addition to the questionnaire responses, the oral and written notes of the dialogue and the observation of the local research teams were essential to understand the daily life of these families.

16. Chakrabarti, Dipesh (2008): *Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Armed conflict, causes and flows of internal displacement in Cabo Delgado





The war and the precariousness of the serious humanitarian situation have exacerbated the violence suffered by the people of Cabo Delgado. It should be remembered that there are more than 4,000 direct victims of the conflict, approximately half of them civilians. The insurgent attacks and the operations of the Mozambican armed forces generate fear and insecurity, causing massive displacements. Murders, loss of family members, burning of villages, robberies and destruction of patrimony, kidnapping and recruitment of young people, girls and boys, lack of security for women and adolescents who suffer sexual violence, early marriage, sexual exploitation and sex for survival... have become widespread since the beginning of the armed conflict.

The causes of internal displacement

In a context such as Cabo Delgado, an analysis of the genealogy of conflicts is necessary to contextualize the different moments and manifestations of structural violence. Violence is more than a mere

instrumental behavior of some against others, moved by interests and convictions. Violence is a social, historical and culturally determined practice which, in order to understand it, requires attention to at least three types of agents: those who perpetrate it, those who suffer it and those who observe it¹. It is in the interaction between these categories that its phenomenology is concretized².

To try to understand the causes and problems of the humanitarian crisis of displaced people fleeing armed violence in the districts of northern Mozambique, three angles of analysis are proposed: i) the historical recurrence of violence; ii) the low levels of human development indicators; and iii) the intensification of the extractive exploitation of natural resources and changes in the modes of territorial organization.

1. Strathern, Andrew, Stewart, Pamela J., Whitehead (ed.), (2006): *Terror and violence: imagination and the unimaginable*. London: Pluto Press.

2. Schröder, Ingo W. and Schmidt, Bettina E. (ed.), (2001): *Anthropology of violence and conflict*. Abingdon: EASA.

Constant warfare and slow violence in Cabo Delgado

Northern Mozambique, and specifically the province of Cabo Delgado, has historically been characterized by the recurrent persistence of violence since pre-colonial times. In the last 100 years, four main periods of organized armed violence can be identified: the so-called pacification campaigns, which were, in fact, wars of colonial occupation from the last quarter of the 19th century well into the 20th century;

the war of liberation between 1963 and 1974; the 16-year war between 1976 and 1992; and the current war since 2017³. This period of

3. Between 1885 and 1926, many villages violently resisted the mining and agricultural businesses of the Niassa Company that had been granted the lands of Cabo Delgado by the Portuguese crown, and which was supported by some Makonde and Makua elites. Resistance against Portugal continued in the face of the colonial administration of the "Estado Novo" of the Salazar dictatorship that ended with the War of Independence (1963-1974). The Makonde communities of Mueda, who founded the revolutionary and pro-independence guerrilla of FRELIMO, liberated large areas of the north of the country, although the south of Cabo Delgado was always reluctant to this Makonde hegemony. Shortly after independence, the 16-year war



time, just over a century, is extraordinarily short for territorial, social and mental stabilization processes to have been carried out and appropriated to generate resilient alternatives to the use of violence in conflict resolution and social stabilization.

In addition to these wars, other issues have had an impact on the development and context of Cabo Delgado: the social and historical conflict in a territory marked

began between the revolutionary government of FRELIMO and the anti-communist opposition of RENAMO, which left more than a million people dead and some 7 million displaced in Mozambique and ended with the Peace Accords of 1992. In Cabo Delgado, while some areas of the province accepted FRELIMO's revolutionary project, other areas were reluctant to the modernization and communal village plans, which allowed RENAMO to gain some support. It should be noted that the recent resurgence of the war by RENAMO demobilized combatants between 2013 and 2019 has not had any noticeable effects in the north of the country. However, the war in Cabo Delgado made its appearance again at the end of 2017, with violent attacks in the area of the gas mega-projects starring, according to state authorities, radicalized sectors of Islam. The feeling of discrimination and abandonment of the Muslim-majority coastal populations in the face of well-positioned Makonde elites in the FRELIMO cadres, and disputes over control of wealth and business between local and national political elites are elements that recur in this history of violence and armed conflict in northern Mozambique. Garcia, Francisco Proença (2001): *Análise global de uma guerra (Moçambique 1964 -1974)*. Porto: Universidade Portucalense [Doctoral dissertation]; Serra, Carlos (org.) (2000): *História de Moçambique*. 1999. Vol I. Part I: *Primeiras sociedades sedentárias e impacto dos mercadores: 200/300-1885*. Parte II: *Agressão imperialista: 1886-1930*. Maputo: Livraria Universitária; Coelho, João Paulo Borges; Macaringue (2002): "Da paz negativa à paz positiva: uma perspectiva histórica sobre o papel das forças armadas moçambicanas num contexto de segurança em transformação", *Estudos Moçambicanos*; No. 20. Maputo: Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, p. 41-90. Katto, Jonna (2017): *Beautiful Mozambique. Haptics of belonging in the life narratives of female war veterans*. Helsinki: University of Helsinki, [PhD thesis]; Pirio, Gregory, Pittelli, Adam Yussuf (2019): 'The Many Drivers Enabling Extremism in Northern Mozambique', Africa Center for Strategic Studies URL: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-many-drivers-enabling-violent-extremism-in-northern-mozambique/>; Matsinhe, David; Eloi, Estácio (2019): *The genesis of insurgency in northern Mozambique*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.


by important trade routes in the Indian Ocean and its consequent cultural, religious and political mobility; the dynamics of the dispute for hegemony between the Salafi and Sufi traditions of Islam, accentuated in the last two decades; and a complex ethno-linguistic diversity with some latent conflicts⁴.

In addition to these internal dynamics, the geographical location on the Mozambique Channel and on the east coast of Africa, and its geostrategic position for the control of the Indian Ocean, have also contributed to the repeated appearance of instability. Drug trafficking routes from Central Asia, the expansion of the extractive frontier and the consequent struggle for dominance of resources in the area, the illegal trade of products and goods, including the smuggling of timber and precious stones, are some of the dynamics and conflicts that must also be considered.

The impacts of these conflicts have shaped a slow (Nixon 2011⁵) and structural violence in Cabo Delgado, which is reproduced in time and space, in a dispersed, subtle, seemingly

4. The province has a multi-ethnic population: the majority are Makwa, then Makonde and finally the Mwanis. Several languages are also spoken: Emakhuwa, Shimakonde, Kimwani, Swahili, Ngoni, Ajaua and Portuguese. The level of complexity of the substratum of violence present in Cabo Delgado society increases when one takes into account the various dissensions that occurred after political independence in 1975. The mainly Muslim coastal population has been feeling discriminated against by the Makonde Christians of the Mueda plateau. Their more active role in the national liberation struggle seems to be the main argument put forward. This situation is perceived and felt as State violence.

5. Nixon, Rob (2011): *Slow Violence and the environmentalism of the Poor*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press.



insignificant and invisible to the eye, but which ends up penetrating individuals and societies, and which constitutes a repetitive damage that, sooner or later, presents itself as lethal.

Violence, during this long period, has a complex genealogy, whose structural axis is based on the resistance of dominated populations and groups to exercise greater control over their present and future. The

ideologies and matrices underlying violence have been based on resistance to forms of domination over people and resources, forms of oppression and control that have characterized the territory and the economic, political and social systems over the last 100 years, reaching revolutionary contours that have taken different forms throughout history, including the war of independence, the war of 16 years and, in the last 4 years, the war in Cabo Delgado.




Figure 1: Vulnerability factors of the Cabo Delgado population

Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan of the Mozambican Government¹

1. Rapid Response Plan: Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique, May-December, 2020 <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/rapid-response-plan-cabo-delgado-province-mozambique-may-december-2020>

This situation of constant violence has undermined the individual and collective capacities of the people of Cabo Delgado, preventing them, through fear, from collaborating with each other, planning lives beyond daily survival, and/or imagining a peaceful existence.

Increasing vulnerability in Cabo Delgado

The time sequence between the year 2000⁶ and 2020 of the Human Development Indexes (HDI) published by UNDP for Mozambique does not show a positive balance, as it continues to be the 7th worst performing country in the world. As shown in Figure 1, poverty and inequalities remain deep and persistent. The COVID-19 pandemic, and the persistence of extreme weather events and particularly the war that started in 2017, have only worsened these human development data.

Cabo Delgado has an estimated population of 2,320,261 inhabitants according to the 2017 national census⁷, with an eminently rural society (83.2%), although the displacements

caused by the war are altering the demographic composition, distribution and the occupation of the territory. According to data from 2022⁸ have been displaced 946,508 people, representing 40.79% of the inhabitants of the province. Many families have been forced to seek refuge in Pemba City and other districts of the province and the country, further aggravating existing problems of mobility, sanitation, access to public services and security. Agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining occupy the majority of the economically active population which is 44.1%⁹. In addition to the low coverage and fragility of social and economic infrastructures and services, low productivity and low diversification of products and services, and insufficient skilled labor, different humanitarian reports¹⁰ also highlight the deficiency of health units, lack of qualified personnel, lack of medicines, food insecurity, access to low quality commercial supply networks of subsistence goods and services.

8. See here: <https://displacement.iom.int/mozambique>. Source accessed on October 5, 2022.

9. MASC (2021): "Cabo Delgado precisa de apoio de todos". Malamulelo - Suplemento. Disponível em https://www.masc.org.mz/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Suplemento_Cabo-Delgado.pdf.

10. Abellán, Beatriz; Guereña, Arantxa (2021): Emergencia alimentaria en Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, conflicto armado y desplazamiento forzado como motores de la inseguridad alimentaria. Institute for Conflict Studies and Humanitarian Action.

6. UNDP (2000): Human Development Report 2000. Madrid, Barcelona, Mexico: Ediciones Mundi Prensa; and UNDP (2020): Relatório do Desenvolvimento Humano 2020. A próxima fronteira. O Desenvolvimento Humano e o Antropoceno. New York: UNDP.

7. See here: <http://www.ine.gov.mz/iv-rgph-2017/cabo-delgado/quadro-1-populacao-recenseada-por-area-de-residencia-e-categoria-censitaria-segundo-idade-e-sexo-provincia-de-cabo-delgado-2017.xlsx/view>



The extractivist exploitation of natural resources and the new dynamics of land occupation and management

In recent years in Mozambique, especially in the province of Cabo Delgado, there has been a significant increase in the exploitation of natural resources, with special emphasis on the mineral-energy complex¹¹. Among the different extractive activities, on the one hand, the mining activity carried out by national, foreign and mixed capital companies that carry out large-scale extraction, specifically of rubies, graphite and other semiprecious stones, stands out. On the other hand, artisanal mining is attracting an increasing number of people to this informal, small-scale activity which, in the absence of expectations in rural areas and the prospect of obtaining better and quicker income, has become the main source of livelihood for part of the local population, and other people from neighboring provinces

and neighboring countries¹². Despite the attraction that artisanal mining still exerts, increasingly subject to the control and interests of the State and large companies, conflicts and repressive maneuvers against artisanal miners continue on a regular basis, without offering viable alternatives to this way of life¹³.

For its part, hydrocarbon exploitation is the one that deserves the most attention from the government, companies and national and international organizations. The implementation of mega-extractive projects for liquefied gas on the north coast and rubies, gold and graphite in the interior-south zone of Cabo Delgado in the last decade have led to a quantitative and qualitative increase in violence in this province. The new extractive activities, particularly those related to gemstones, have contributed to the destructuring of weak family farming economies in favor of new

11. In this regard see: Sousa, Maria Eduarda Andrade (2016): "A exploração mineira e o reassentamento forçado em Moçambique: Uma reflexão sobre a situação dos deslocados do desenvolvimento", REMHU Rev. Interdiscip. Mobil. Hum., 47, 204-209; Ruiz, Zahinos Ruiz; Antolin, Pedro del C; Gonzalez, Anil das G.; Amelia, Gomonda (2018): Meio ambiente e mineração artesanal em três distritos de Cabo Delgado: Ancuabe, Montepuez e Namuno, Barcelona, Barcelona, Medicus Mundi Mediterrània; WLSA Moçambique e VSO Moçambique (2019): "Factos sobre o impacto das práticas extractivas com ênfase nos direitos das mulheres". Fact sheet, Março 2019. Available at www.wlsa.org.mz/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Factsheet_PT.pdf.

12. Mondlane, S., and D. S. M. Shoko (2003): "The socio-economic and environmental impacts of artisanal and small-scale mining in Mozambique", in Gavin M. Hilson (ed.): The Socio-Economic Impacts of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in Developing Countries. Boca Raton. CRC Press.

13. In a documentary produced in 2017 by Medicus Mundi 'The Gold Rush' this reality was collected audiovisually, pointing out how from 2010, these large companies closed many of the artisanal deposits causing violent incidents, repression and expulsion of a good part of the miners who exploited informally those mines, and showing how this artisanal mining economy was put to an end without offering alternatives. Along the same lines, another work carried out by SEKELKANI in 2015, revealed the conflicts between local populations, the government and companies related to mining projects in the provinces of Tete and Cabo Delgado.

sources of income. While men abandon their families to go in search of precious minerals, women are left in charge of the household and their gardens, having to cope with increasing criminality, sexual assaults and early marriages of their daughters.

In these years, there has also been an increase in episodes of violence committed by private security companies against "garimpeiros¹⁴" and "hustlers", and by certain sectors of the state security forces. Furthermore, the non-fulfillment of promises of employment and improvements in health, education and community services promised by the government and large companies, as well as forced resettlements and displacements due to land occupation by transnational companies that did not adequately compensate the affected communities, have disappointed social expectations, particularly among large sectors of the youth.

Mining and gas exploration concessions cover a large part of the territory of Cabo Delgado province, promoting the activities of national and international private companies, considered essential for the country's development, and deepens the structural and cultural violence of local populations, who watch as they lose their rights to use and enjoy natural resources in favor of large corporations.

14. Informal or illegal artisanal miners.

Explanatory narratives of this "new war" in Cabo Delgado

Since the end of 2017 until today, violent attacks have been occurring in the north of Cabo Delgado in the areas of the gas extractivist megaprojects, triggering a new war¹⁵. Although the official version maintains that it is a terrorist aggression by the Islamic State, there are other explanations to this conflict that has escalated, internationalized and complexified to cause almost 4,000 fatalities and more than 946,000 displaced people.

A first line of narrative comes from local leaders who do not occupy formal positions of power, and who maintain that the war has exposed the contradictions and injustices of a long historical process.

They are convinced that the government knows the protagonists and that it does not have sufficient political will to put an end to the conflict, while in the background of the war there are many economic interests based on wealth that benefit a few, instead


15. The concept of "new wars" explains armed conflicts that intermingle issues related to organized crime and massive human rights violations, that have local and international components, that respond to public and private interests, and that leave behind the logic of inter- and intra-state conflicts of the Cold War era. Kaldor, Mary (2012): *New and Old Wars*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

of its "owners", that is, the population of Cabo Delgado that is being excluded from its benefits.

A second narrative line is found in the official discourses of government officials and some national and international intellectuals and think tanks, which maintain that this war is a foreign aggression with strong connections to the Islamic State and its interest in destabilizing Mozambique in order to appropriate its wealth and consolidate its political power in the region. The involvement of SADC forces, Rwanda and the financial and military

support of the EU and the US reinforce the idea that this is a global problem that must be fought with the commitment of regional and world powers.

The third narrative line, more critical and academic, defended by some intellectuals and leaders of national and international organizations, highlights the enormous complexity of the factors at play that are articulated locally, in such a way that they create the conditions for the outbreak and prolongation of the conflict. Endogenous factors of a social, economic, political and historical nature are combined with regional



ISLAMIST INSURGENCE and MILITARY RESPONSE:

- Violent attacks in 2012 by local group "Al Shabab" in Moçimboas do Praia and response by Mozambican Armed Forces. Inability to control the situation
- Hiring of private armies (Wagner, PSME-STEEP, Lancaster 6 group)
- Divisions in Government-FRELIMO for control of natural resources and war business



- Faced with the seizure of Palma and Moçimboas, the Government of Mozambique resorts to the SADC (Operation SAMIM) and the Rwandan army
- EU military support EUTM-Mozambique
- France and EU support Rwandan army to support Total Energies

EXTRACTIVE MEGAPROJECTS :

- 2011-12 Anadarko and ENI gas explorations 2021-2022 ENH (Mozambican government capital) and the French TOTAL ENERGIES, the main investor in the Mozambique LNG gas project
- Ruby mining in Namanhunbir by Montepuez Ruby Mining and Mwiriti Ltda, and graphite mining by foreign companies in the interior districts of the province



HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

- 4,000 deaths
- 946,000 displaced persons
- 1,300,000 people dependent on humanitarian aid
- Keneth and Idai cyclones in 2019 and escalation of war 2020-21
- Humanitarian Response Plans for Mozambique (UN and clusters to coordinate aid) and Northern Integrated Development Agency -ADIN-
- Concentration of displaced communities in the city of Pemba and districts of Ancuabe and Metuge
- Inadequate food aid, corruption and discrimination in its distribution
- Displaced families highly dependent on aid, and uncertainty about return and alternative livelihoods

Figure 2: Explanatory keys to the Conflict in Cabo Delgado. Source: Own elaboration based on UNCHR, Cabo Delgado Situation, 03 to 16 February 2021.

and international factors related to the contemporary political economy and the geostrategic location of the country.

Thus, to try to explain the causes of this new war and its humanitarian effects, it is not enough to point out the growing military and financial support of the Islamic State to the insurgents. It is necessary to address other keys such as conflicts between ethnic groups, the lack of expectations of the majority of the population that has to face growing poverty and inequality, and the struggle for control of Cabo Delgado's resources (Alberdi

& Barroso, 2021)¹⁶ in the expansion of extractive frontiers.

Dynamics of the armed conflict

Based on the accounts of the participants in this and previous research, the following timeline of the conflict can be traced.

16. Alberdi, Jokin; Barroso, Manuel (2020): "Broadening the analysis of peace in Mozambique: Exploring emerging violence in times of transnational extractivism in Cabo Delgado". *Global Society, Issue2. [Volume 35]*.

TIMELINE OF CONFLICT IN CABO DELGADO




Figure 3: Timeline.

Phase I - From the beginning of the decade to 2017: local incubation and pre-war situation

Some of the testimonies collected point to the incubation of the pre-war situation prior to 2017. Previous resentments against the State, aggravated by the occupation of land and fishing areas by large companies, repression on artisanal mining, and the perception that some foreign elites were getting richer, as well as a mismanagement of the communities' expectations in the face of the extractive industry phenomenon, were encouraging a feeling of popular revolt in Cabo Delgado. It was in this context, where several organized Muslim youth leaders appeared in Mucojo, Mocímboa da Praia and Palma, who had the support of foreigners who had businesses and investments in the country, and who took advantage of the degradation of the precarious living conditions of the population and the human rights violations to mobilize and recruit young people for the insurgency (Cunha, 2021)¹.

This group of young Muslims, with scarce resources, but with community and younger generation support create "Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama" (al-Shabaab) that builds its own mosques and madrassas to preach Islam and teach literacy to the communities. Disputes with the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO) led to their expulsion from the mosques and the arrest of about thirty of their members who were imprisoned in several police posts in Mocímboa da Praia (Bonate, 2010)². In October 2017, these youths tried to free the detainees, killing several policemen.

1. Cunha, Teresa (2021): "Arrancando-nos da nossa terra, arrancamos as raízes e ficamos só no mundo um retrato da guerra em Cabo Delgado nas vozes das mulheres", 1-64. Available at: <https://territoriolab.org/otros-recursos/>

2. Bonate, Liazzat (2010): 'Islam in Northern Mozambique: A historical Overview', History Compass, 8/7. pp. 573 - 593. Bonate, Liazzat (2009), 'Muslims of Northern Mozambique and Liberation Movements', Social Dynamics, 280-294. [Volume 35, no. 2].

Phase II - Late 2017 and early 2018: flight and return

Between the end of 2017 and the beginning of 2018, the first violent attacks by the local Islamist insurgent group Al Shabaab took place. They were more systematic attacks, especially against state institutions, and the first displacements occurred. According to the Government, these were one-off episodes of flight and return of civilians, so no particular measures were taken, thinking that the situation would be easily controllable.

Phase III - Year 2018: from illusion to the beginning of disappointment

In 2018, attacks against the State and the Government civil service intensified, affecting some villages in the central and northern districts of the province (Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade and Macomia). Part of the population still did not perceive the threat and, in view of the State's abandonment, expected to benefit from the Islamist insurgency. Military targets were more selective, against specific properties and individuals, while collaborating with the authorities. This distrust and abandonment of the Mozambican government was not a sufficient argument to popularize Al Shabaab either, since the majority of the population chose not to collaborate or sympathize with the insurgency in the face of its forced recruitment actions (Silva & Cunha, 2021)¹.

1. Silva, Terezinha da, Cunha, Teresa (2021): "O Saber ocupa lugar. A Construção da paz e da coesão social em Cabo Delgado", Maputo: Fundação MASC, 1-80.

Phase IV - In 2019, violence takes hold and mistrust becomes widespread

In 2019, violence was installed and distrust became widespread, particularly towards the national security forces, since rather than defending it, there were many people who considered that they were involved in violence and robberies.

Although not yet on a large scale, displacements increased due to the increase in violent episodes, and because there were many families who had already lost everything. There was still no systematized information and data on the situation. The government still did not accept that it was a war, and did not respond adequately to the gravity of the situation.

Phase V - 2020: the occupation of Mocímboa da Praia and the massive flight of the population

The conflict escalated exponentially in the years 2020 and 2021, particularly from the attacks and occupations by the insurgency of the cities of Mocímboa da Praia and Palma, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to flee to other regions of the province. The attack and occupation of Mocímboa da Praia in March 2020 marked an important turning point in the course of the war. The insurgent groups demonstrated that they could cause not only physical, but also institutional and political damage and hold important places for long periods of time.

People began to flee en masse, trying to reach safe places such as the provincial capital, Pemba or Mueda. The first reception camps were organized, and the testimonies of the fleeing people were heard. With the launching of humanitarian operations and the arrival of UN agencies and NGOs, national and international attention increased thanks to the first news, reports, testimonies and studies on the situation in Cabo Delgado. The cooperation organizations that were already working in the territory had to adapt their approach to respond to the challenges of the new situation. The militarization of Cabo Delgado begins.

Phase VI - 2021 to the present: the militarization of Cabo Delgado and the arrival of foreign troops from Rwanda and SADC (SAMIM)

Displacement continues to be the general trend. First with the seizure of Palma by the insurgents in March 2021 which led to the withdrawal of Total Energies and its staff, and also a significant spike in the displacement of thousands of families who were already sheltered in the Afungi peninsula. Following the recovery of these strategic locations by the SAMIM mission and the Rwandan army in 2021 there were a few returns, but the withdrawal of the insurgency to other areas is producing new attacks in 2022, located in villages in Nangade, Meluco, Macomia and Quirimbas, and more recently in the south of Cabo Delgado (Ancuabe, Balama, Chiure, Mecufi, Montepuez and Namuno), and in the border areas with the provinces of Niassa and Nampula. The international military operations have not stabilized the situation, leaving large areas of great economic interest emptied, and prolonging the pressure on the camps and host communities, with families who have been displaced for more than three years.

The expansion to the southern region makes the response more complex due to the increase in the territorial range and the number of affected communities. The change in the pattern of insurgency activities, returning to guerrilla and pillaging tactics with dispersed communities, has consolidated a model of terror in which with few troops, significant impacts are achieved, resulting in massive and temporary displacements.

Displacement flows

According to IOM data from June 2022¹, there were 946,508 displaced persons, equivalent to 208,046 families. 55% are children, 24% women and 21% men. Thirty percent (287,664 people) are in shelters or resettlement centers, while the remaining 70% (658,844 people) live in private homes that have taken them in, which implies that most of them are crowded in homes and land belonging to relatives, friends, neighbors or people who have taken them in².

The vast majority, 870,000, remain in the province of Cabo Delgado. While the rest are distributed among the provinces of Nampula (74,000), Niassa (2,000), Zambezia (680), Inhambane (86) and Sofala (310)³. However, it should be noted that these numbers are incomplete, as there is no data on displaced persons in the districts of Mocímboa da Praia and Palma, directly affected by the armed conflict⁴.

The government's refusal to recognize the first displacements caused by the armed conflict in 2017 prevented the arrival of international humanitarian aid. It was the devastating cyclones Kenneth and Idai,

which in 2019 activated the arrival of the main UN agencies in Cabo Delgado. The first response to internal displacement, before the activation of humanitarian operations, was carried out by the social networks of local people. It was family ties, relationships or simply the solidarity of Mozambican citizens that cushioned the first shock of displaced people. Once the international humanitarian operation was in place, it was after the attacks on Mocímboa do Praia in April 2020 and the first massive waves of people seeking refuge that the Rapid Response Plan for Cabo Delgado was activated, which made it possible to organize the first humanitarian responses directly related to the war in the district of Metuge.

The presence of cooperation and humanitarian aid in Cabo Delgado

Between the 1992 peace accords and prior to this last war, some twenty bilateral and multilateral agencies (with a prominent role of Spanish and US cooperation), together with some thirty international NGOs, local organizations, including many of them under the umbrella of the Cabo Delgado NGO Forum (FOCADE-CD) worked on development initiatives in Cabo Delgado.

During the last three decades, most of the efforts have focused on areas such as the expansion of basic services (with special emphasis on health and education), governance and food security, although environmental, human rights, gender and child protection projects are also noteworthy. Without questioning the positive

1. Source accessed on 05-10-2022: <https://displacement.iom.int/mozambique>

2. IOM, (2022): Displacement Tracking Matrix. Baseline Assessment Round 16 - (May-June 2022).

3. Idem.

4. Médecins Sans Frontières, which works in the region, estimated in January 2022 that internal displacement in these districts could reach around 50,000 people. MSF. 04.01.2022 <https://www.msf.es/actualidad/mozambique/mozambique-la-poblacion-se-mueve-tanto-huir-la-violencia-regresar-casa>

contribution of many of these initiatives, it should not be forgotten that the last links of the community, where most of the most needy peasant and fishing communities, particularly women and youth, are located, were not able to effectively benefit from these development and international cooperation initiatives due to the fragmentation of aid, the lack of long-term joint strategies and the existing position of enormous poverty⁵.

The current humanitarian operations in Cabo Delgado are financed by the World Bank (WB), United States, European Union, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden and Norway, in addition to private funds, through the United Nations and international organizations present in the field⁶. The activity is organized through the cluster system (food security, shelter, protection, water and sanitation, and education...) involving governmental and non-governmental, national and international organizations and Mozambican authorities. These clusters seek to strengthen the coordination of the response by trying to ensure leadership, transparency and partnership, to coordinate at local, national and international levels, to share information and to seek common and harmonized responses. Part of the aid is channeled through NGOs⁷ that implement

their own projects, or receive funds through tenders and contracts.

In addition to these international initiatives, the Government of Mozambique, through the National Institute for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (INGD), the Provincial Reconstruction Forum of Cabo Delgado led by the Provincial Government, and the Agency for Integrated Development of the North (ADIN), created in 2020, are working to assist the populations affected by the conflict and coordinate humanitarian and reconstruction aid. In addition to bilateral, multilateral, governmental and non-governmental humanitarian aid, it should also be emphasized that a very important part of the assistance is provided by the host communities themselves.

Below is some data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) that expands the picture of the humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado:

- In 2019, the Humanitarian Response Plan for Mozambique⁸ was launched, which only managed to meet almost half of the needs. Of the \$620 million requested in the face of the cyclone disaster in the north of the country, only \$314 million was available, with the US, with almost a third of the total, being the main donor followed by the European Commission/EU, Canada, the UK, Germany and the

Refugee Service, World Vision International, Medicus Mundi, Helvetas, Cooperazione e Sviluppo, Action Against Hunger, AIFO-MOZ, AMA, AVSI foundation, Caritas Diocesana Pemba, Doctors in Africa, Helpcode Italy, Ayuda en Acción.

8. Source OCHA: <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/761/summary> Revised 27.09.2022

5. Alberdi, Jokin and Bidaurratzaga, Eduardo (eds), (2014): Local Human Development in Mozambique, Bilbao, HEGOA, UPV/EHU.

6. OCHA, (2022): Mozambique. 2022. Humanitarian Response Dashboard. July. <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-humanitarian-response-dashboard-july-2022-enpt>

7. The main NGOs present in Cabo Delgado are: Oxfam Novid, Norwegian Refugee Council, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, The mentor initiative, -Care International, Oxfam, Save the Children- COSACA Consortium-, Catholic

UN Emergency Response Pooled Fund. In 2020, the humanitarian needs of Cabo Delgado were more or less covered by the Rapid Response Plan for Cabo Delgado and the 2020 COVID-19 Mozambique Plan. The former sought to respond specifically to the growing number of people displaced by the war with an allocation of \$35.5 million, an amount that was significantly exceeded with an overfunding of \$52.1 million⁹. For its part, the 2020 national plan to address the pandemic required \$68.1 million, with \$61.7 million obtained, or just over 90%. The main donors to these plans in 2020 were the USA with almost 40%, the EU and its member states with more than 20%¹⁰.

- In 2021 and 2022, again the humanitarian response for Cabo Delgado was carried out under the umbrella of a national program. In 2021, the expectations of the Humanitarian Response Plan for Mozambique were almost a fifth short of expectations (\$201 million of the \$254 million required was raised). Although other humanitarian funds of \$116.9.7 million arrived outside

9. The U.S. was the main contributor with \$18.1 million and the UN Common Emergency Response Fund with \$14 million, supplemented by \$6.9 million from the EU and other smaller amounts from Japan, Sweden, Ireland, the United Kingdom and other countries. This specific Plan for Cabo Delgado was intended to provide sectoral responses to the needs of 354,000 people, approximately half (712,000) of those in need of humanitarian assistance due to the war. Source OCHA: <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/997/summary>. Revised 27.09.2022

10. Source OCHA: <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/152/summary/2020> Revised 27.09.2022

the Plan¹¹. Provisional data for 2022 indicate that the Emergency Response Plan for Tropical Storm Gombe, which affected more than 700,000 people, mostly in the province of Nampula bordering Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique, is being met with many difficulties, in that of the \$48.1 million planned, not even 20% has been covered. The Humanitarian Response Plan for Mozambique 2022 foresees \$388.5 million, having received as of September \$207.5 million¹².

In 2022, the Government of Mozambique is negotiating with the EU, WB and other major donors for funding of \$2.5 billion, which is planned to be included in the Program for Resilience and Integrated Development of the North (PREDIN). However, this is being questioned for its centralism and weak participation of local authorities, communities and civil society¹³.

Despite the efforts of some non-governmental organizations in the clusters that have tried to differentiate the realities of displaced people and include host communities in humanitarian operations, the governmental and UN emergency response has been based primarily on

11. Source OCHA: <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/152/summary/2021> Revised 27.09.2022

12. Source OCHA: <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/152/summary/2022> Revised 27.09.2022

13. CDC (2022): "PREDIN has a heavy, centralized structure with weak participation of communities and civil society" *Política Moçambicana*, Year IV, no. 379. Centro para Democracia e Desenvolvimento. 2022.08.14

responding universally and uniformly to the immediate survival needs of displaced populations. In any case, the duration of the conflict and the scarcity of means to alleviate the crisis has failed to meet its objectives. The systems and services related to emergency assistance in the case of Cabo Delgado require reform to introduce adequate vectors and actions in an approach that would, at the same time, address the immediate needs, restore the dignity, livelihoods and peace of the affected communities.

One of the major challenges is the search for and implementation of inclusive strategies to address the needs of displaced and host communities and reduce social conflict. The lack of an inclusive strategy is resulting in increased pressure on the scarce resources and pre-existing services in these communities (water points, access to arable land, schools, health centers and hospitals...). This difficult equation requires a deep and more effective reflection in order to avoid repeating past mistakes and build a better future.





Figure 5: Map of conflict actors

Description of the arrival process and the conditions of establishment and reception





The general data on the humanitarian situation and the mapping of the main humanitarian actors and the most pressing problems are not sufficient to show the daily reality suffered by hundreds of thousands of people who are victims of a war that they did not provoke or seek.

This chapter presents the results of the questionnaires-dialogue with displaced families, complemented with information from the reports of the main humanitarian organizations working in the field, and in-depth interviews conducted¹.

1. For the situational analysis, between January and February 2022, fifteen semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with leaders of the displaced population and host communities, local and national authorities, and

The articulation of the text responds to a processual approach to the phenomenon of displacement, considering the moments of flight, arrival and reception/adaptation. These 3 moments are not correlative, linear or easily differentiated, since they depend on a set of factors such as social position,

community, national and international humanitarian aid organizations.

All the families interviewed who fled the war have very different backgrounds and stories about their concerns, needs and capacities

receipt of support, reception networks (whether formal or community-based), the context of settlement and the location of the point of departure, including the prospects of return.

It should be emphasized that all the families interviewed who fled the war have very different backgrounds and stories about their concerns, needs and capacities. Some families live with relatives, others have obtained land on which to build their houses, have rented houses or pay rent. Some have access to land on which to farm, others trade, while some are totally dependent on humanitarian aid. Some do not receive or have stopped receiving official aid, others receive it in kind, and most receive it in the form of food vouchers. Some are rebuilding their lives in their new places of refuge, others are waiting patiently to be able to return and others do not know what to do with their future.


The flight

The stories of flight shared by people show some common patterns: the violence and fear of attack; the fear and difficulties

during the flight route; the passage through various places, the dangers and shortages experienced until the destination; the difficulties experienced in obtaining means of transportation; the exhaustion and sadness; the memory of those who stayed in their places of origin, those who disappeared, and those who died along the way.

The decision to leave their homes is a decision mostly made by men as heads of households. In some cases it was a joint decision. They leave because: "life was difficult, they were attacked almost every day", "they thought that the safe place was Pemba", "they had to leave Mocímboa da Praia and look for a better place to be" or "the war was getting worse and they had to flee".

Several of the displaced persons report that, before arriving at the place where they are settled today, they went through several places. Some of the families stayed with close relatives, and after a few months ended up moving to another place because of lack of privacy, or because the space was too small for all of them, or because the host families could no longer bear to keep them in their



homes. Others went through several places before arriving in Pemba, the temporary centers, or the resettlements. Generally, they settled for weeks in borrowed houses, with relatives or people who took them in out of solidarity. In some cases, the stay has been prolonged in host families, in others, they have already been able to have their own space, find a house or live independently. In any case, living conditions continue to be minimal, surviving in some cases on aid or precarious activities to meet basic needs, and without the possibility of planning more lasting solutions that would help them to overcome their situation of vulnerability.

Flight and destination selection strategies respond to a set of factors that condition the choice of displaced groups². Issues such as family or other types of support and solidarity networks (people go where they have pre-existing social ties or where there are people or groups that can support them), the existence of formal support or aid

2. See Scudder, Thayer and Colson, Elizabeth: "From welfare to development: a conceptual framework for the analysis of dislocated people". In Hansen, Art and Oliver-Smith, (ed.), (2018): *Involuntary migration and resettlement. The problems and response of dislocated people*. New York, Routledge.

hubs (there are districts or localities that, especially in the case of transit centers, have generated the image that these are areas where they will receive some type of support, as in the case of the transit centers, have generated the image that these are areas where they will receive some type of support, as is the case of Metuge or Montepuez), economic capacity and social position (families with more resources in many cases take refuge in cities, because they have the means, although scarce, to resume their lives with minimal assistance), among others, have conditioned and condition the choice of the destination locale.

Arrival

In Metuge, Mueda, Nangade, Ancuabe and Chiure are the main temporary centers for the displaced population in emergency shelters made of canvas and/or bamboo. There are other smaller camps in the districts of Balama and Namuno. There are districts such as Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, Quissanga and Muidumbe, where due to the situation of insecurity and conflict, it has hardly been possible to establish reception centers, so that displaced



families in these territories have no or very limited access to humanitarian aid, also due to the lack of security also suffered by UN agencies and national and international NGOs.

According to DTM/IOM data as of June 2022, of the 946,508 displaced persons, only 30% (287,664 persons) were relocated in resettlement centers, temporary settlements or extensions of host communities. These centers are located in the southern and northern districts of the province, and are managed by the Government or

international organizations such as IOM, for the most part, but also by other entities such as UNHCR-AVSI (Montepuez) and SOLIDARITÉS (Mueda). The remaining 70% (658,844 people) are being sheltered by family and friends. According to the same source, approximately 65% of the displaced persons are in the city of Pemba (139,566), followed by the districts of Metuge (126,000), Nangade (116,538), Mueda (104,270) and Ancuabe (82,496). Assistance remains limited in the districts that received a large influx of people (Ancuabe, Montepuez, Mueda and Palma), and the needs for housing space,




Figure 5: Displaced population in the Cabo Delgado reception centers
Prepared by: AeA Moçambique, Source: CCCM August 2022

An important part of the aid received by displaced persons corresponds to that provided by the host communities themselves


access to water and sanitation in Pemba and nearby districts (Balama, Chiure, Mecufi, Namuno) remain acute³.

It should be noted that an important part of the aid received by displaced persons corresponds to that provided by the host communities themselves. In the face of chronic poverty and economic inequalities in the rural areas of Cabo Delgado, local communities have historically developed practices of solidarity and community and family aid. When some families did not get the expected harvests or fishing was not successful, they had their own mechanisms of redistribution of resources and maintenance of human dignity. These mechanisms, linked to the practices of extended families and solidarity networks, are helping to cushion the impact of displacement.

The massive displacement of entire communities from the northern coastal area to the south and interior of the province has activated these solidarity mechanisms, to the point that around three out of every four displaced persons receive support from their own networks that welcome them directly or facilitate their resettlement conditions, providing them with shelter, food, or spaces where they can restart their life projects.

However, the scarcity of food resources is extensive to many of these host families, who

3. IOM, (2022): Displacement Tracking Matrix. Baseline Assessment Round 16 - (May-June 2022).



have few possibilities to produce due to lack of land, and who have precarious or informal jobs, so they are forced to spend most of their monetary income (approximately 90%) to buy food in the markets. Paradoxically, many families in official resettlement centers have a better food situation than many host families. This situation is particularly worrying in Pemba City, where 40% of the population is in a critical stage of acute food insecurity (above CPI 3)⁴.

Of the people interviewed who arrived in the city of Pemba, they indicated that they went there in search of security, mainly because they had relatives, friends or acquaintances from their places of origin. Different settlement modalities have been identified: i) families that after some time living with their relatives manage to become independent; ii) families that live in houses that have been lent to them by people they know without paying anything in return; iii)

families that live together in their relatives' houses (even two or three families), which causes many difficulties and tensions due to overcrowding; and iv) displaced families that get together to share the costs of renting a joint house in the city. This does not preclude the existence of other forms of settlement, such as taking in unknown families in exchange for food checks or other types of exchanges, or the existence of spontaneous settlements of people who occupy land or irregularly rent these spaces on the outskirts of cities and towns.

For their part, individuals and families in camps have different trajectories. In several of the accounts, it is noted that once they fled the war, during the first weeks they stayed with families they did not know, who offered them their homes out of mere solidarity. Then they moved to the displaced population centers. Interviews indicate that, during the emergency, the reception centers did not have any conditions to ensure access to basic services and living conditions (water and sanitation, shelter, protection, access to food, health, education...), that they were

4. Abellán, Beatriz; Guereña, Arantxa (2021): Food emergency in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, armed conflict and forced displacement as drivers of food insecurity. Institute for Studies on Conflict and Humanitarian Action.



totally precarious and that they did not have any infrastructure that would allow people to survive with dignity.

The phenomenon of forced displacement implies the rupture of the old links and networks that sustained and guaranteed the lives of families. Arrival is therefore not only a traumatic but also a creative moment. It entails a process of initial reconstruction of the basic elements of life and social articulation, all in a new location, without forgetting the afflictions caused by the loss of loved ones and by the traumas experienced during the flight. From all of the above, it can be inferred that the conditions of arrival and reception, in the case of internally displaced persons in Cabo Delgado, due to their precarious conditions, are not very favorable for the reestablishment of their way of life.

From this and other studies carried out by the team we can gather some of the impacts of the war as mentioned by the affected people themselves:

- The financial, emotional, spatial and food stress suffered by communities and families hosting displaced persons.
- The rise in the cost of living, the drastic impoverishment and indebtedness of families and the increase in inequalities.
- Trauma suffered from the experience of the loss of family members through murder, kidnapping or mistreatment by the various actors in the war.
- Disruption of lifestyles and rites of passage considered fundamental to personal and collective life.
- Lack of access to plants and other natural medicines that people use in their daily lives in their local areas of origin.
- The increase in sexual violence against women and girls, which manifests itself in many forms: sexual slavery, forced marriages of adolescents, prostitution, forced pregnancies, sexual abuse by civilian and military authorities and local

In addition to the accumulated violence, suffering and fears they bring with them, there are the immediate needs of survival and the lack of certainty about their future

leadership, sexual violence perpetrated by husbands and partners in the domestic context.

Adaptation

Once families are forced to flee their homes, their land, and abandon everything to escape the war, they must start their lives anew in another place - not always familiar, not always known. In addition to the accumulated violence, suffering and fears they bring with them, there are the immediate needs of survival and the lack of certainty about their future. It is in this transition that their new routine unfolds. A daily life different from the one they had before. Worrying about the day to day without much certainty to find lasting solutions. In the following blocks of this section, aspects of this daily life are collected.

BLOCK 1. FOOD: Malnutrition, differentiated and limited access to food

Malnutrition is one of the most worrying problems in Mozambique as a whole. The war in Cabo Delgado and the constant environmental catastrophes are exacerbating the situation in the north of the country. In this province, 90% of households of displaced people and 72% of households in host communities are in a situation of unacceptable food insecurity according to World Food Program (WFP) indicators⁵. There are more than 75,000 children under five years of age in a situation of acute malnutrition⁶.

The WFP assists some 400,000 people per month in the northern provinces of the country, most of them in Cabo Delgado⁷. This organization, together with FAO, leads the food security cluster, which has opted

5. Cited in Abellán & Guereña, 2021.

6. IPC (2021) Mozambique [Cabo Delgado]: Food Security and Nutrition Snapshot I. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification. July 2021 <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-cabo-delgado-food-security-and-nutrition-snapshot-1-july-2021>

7. WFP Mozambique Country Brief, June 2022 <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/wfp-mozambique-country-brief-june-2022>



for the distribution of food aid through two modalities: in kind or in cash. In-kind aid consists of the monthly (or bimonthly) delivery of a family food basket containing 50 kg (sometimes half) of cereals, 5 l. of oil, 10 kg of beans. The WFP is primarily responsible for the distribution of these baskets, which are delivered by households to the head of the household.

The other modality is cash assistance in the form of monthly "exchange vouchers" worth MZN 3,600 (about \$55), which are distributed by neighborhood and village chiefs to displaced families, regardless of the number of people in the family unit. This type of assistance predominates in places where there are local markets or some degree of trade, especially in the city of Pemba, where there is capacity for local sourcing.

As an example, in the months of April and May 2022, the Food Security Cluster Cluster assisted 1,025,000 people in these two months but had to distribute half rations due to resource constraints. Approximately one-third of the aid was distributed mainly

as in-kind assistance, and a small portion as immediate response ration. The other two-thirds of the aid was distributed via checks or vouchers⁸.

Food distribution, although critical, is somewhat better in the reception and resettlement centers located in the districts of Metuge, Ancuabe, Montepuez, Chiure, Balama, Namuno and Mecufi. Outside these centers, food distribution directly or via "exchange vouchers" also reaches host households, mainly in Pemba City, and in the districts of Mueda, Nangade and Meluco⁹.

The lack of aid is emphasized both by the heads of humanitarian organizations and by the families interviewed. They point out that it is more constant and better known in the

8. Source OCHA: <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-food-security-outlook-june-2022-january-2023> . Revised 10.08.2022

9. Source OCHA: <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-acute-malnutrition-situation-february-march-2021-and-projections-april> . Revised 10.08.2022. Most of the food aid is distributed in Pemba (195,000 people), Metuge (90,000 people), Chiure (45,000 people), Ancuabe (35,000 people) Montepuez (35,000 people) and Nampula City (25,000 people).



reception centers than in the City of Pemba, where aid is more intermittent and the difficulties of access to information and food exchange vouchers seem to be greater.

The families interviewed in the cities report that they do not have much support. Few organizations operate in urban neighborhoods. They only receive food, through "exchange vouchers" with which they obtain mainly oil, rice, flour, spaghetti pasta and beans. Food is scarce and not very diversified. For that value (3,600 MZN) it is not possible to cover the food demand. The checks are valid to collect food only. They do not have access to other products such as sugar, wheat flour, meat, fish, or toiletries. Those who manage to get these vouchers have done so thanks to neighborhood leaders or other families who have left them their vouchers when they have left. The support is transitory: at the beginning, they receive monthly, then every two months and

after a while they no longer have it, although their situation of need does not improve, nor is more structural aid provided.

In the case of the families in the settlement camps, the reality varies according to the place where they are located. In the case of Montepuez (Mapupulo - Nacate), assistance is scarcer. It is practically limited to the supply, every two months, of food through the 3,600 MZN voucher. In Ancuabe-Natove, on the other hand, food is distributed directly by the WFP, and they have received support from other organizations that have provided them with other types of non-food products.

In all cases it is noted that the food is insufficient. To solve this situation they develop different strategies: a close relative goes to buy food and helps them; they share the little food there is among all; they reduce the number of meals per day; they save

The displaced women, both in Pemba and in the reception centers, emphasize the lack of food and water, and the need for other products such as clothing, cleaning and household items, and school supplies

food; they try to reduce the amount of food they prepare for each meal; they reduce the amount of food to make it last a little longer; they do odd jobs in other fields to make up for deficiencies.

The displaced women, both in Pemba and in the reception centers, emphasize the lack of food and water, and the need for other products such as clothing, cleaning and household items, and school supplies. They complain about the impossibility of having a more varied diet, since they have been fed on maize, beans and rice since they arrived in their new locations, and have not been able to access meat, milk, fish or chicken for lack of money. However, they say that they have no choice, and that the most important thing is to eat. The men, for their part, insist on the difficulties of access to the vouchers, on the corrupt distribution of food aid, on the high prices, and on the impossibility of using part of the money from these checks for transportation and to buy other products elsewhere at more affordable prices. It should not be forgotten that the war, the pandemic and the inflation of recent months are having an impact on supply chains in Cabo Delgado, resulting in higher prices, particularly for imported products.

Among the solutions proposed by displaced families are: more aid for food purchases, income-generating activities and business development; increasing the value of checks

and cash; and closer and more constant follow-up to ensure that aid reaches the displaced people who need it most.

BLOCK 2. LIVELIHOODS. Difficulties of the displaced population in accessing land for farming and other livelihoods.

Fundamentally, assistance based on the timely delivery of food, money and supplies is the norm. In few cases is access to land guaranteed or solutions are provided to structural issues such as water, alternatives for income generation, health, education. This prevents people from being able to organize themselves in a definitive manner. The degree of improvisation to which people are subjected in order to continue with their lives, whether in the cities or in the temporary and resettlement centers, is such that it is very difficult for many people to think beyond the short term of daily survival.

The prolongation in time of the situation of displaced families is opening a debate on how to articulate strategies for the generation of livelihoods. International

organizations, NGOs and the Government are implementing land transfer programs for crops in temporary shelters, entrepreneurship and micro-credit programs in urban areas, mainly through ADIN, with the help of the WB and UNDP. On the other hand, despite the fact that most of the displaced population is being resettled in definitive centers, this land allocation is not definitive and is not completed with the granting of DUATs, which perpetuates the temporary and precarious situation of these populations.

However, these are not the only ways to access land or to start productive activities. Outside of official institutions, displaced families, mainly in the settlement centers that are receiving land in donation, rent and/or loan in exchange for care or work, report that having an area to cultivate allows them to supplement food when they do not receive food aid. Families living in urban areas have more difficulties in accessing land. They explain that there is no space to grow crops in the city, and that it is difficult to obtain land to do so. Nor is it an option to go to work on other people's land or rent, as in rural areas. At most, they can have small vegetable gardens in the backyards of their homes, but they are forced to buy practically everything in the market and point out that



this, added to the lack of money to buy, translates into food shortages. In either circumstance, most families, both urban and displaced in the camps, need money to purchase larger plots of land, and ask the Government to grant them land so that they are not dependent on other people, and that they be granted other facilities to start new agricultural and/or professional activities.

Unfortunately, the positive initiatives in this area are testimonial and, almost always, poorly planned, and hardly take into consideration the geographical, cultural and ethnic characteristics of the displaced communities. Improvisation has led to paradoxes such as Mwanis fishing communities being moved to inland areas far from the sea, or peasant communities being settled in peri-urban areas where the availability of land for cultivation is very limited or not very productive.

The option of planning large temporary reception centers with tens of thousands of displaced people does not seem to have helped much either. This strategy is provoking conflicts with resident communities over disputed access to scarce

services and existing farmland. For example, the relocation of a significant part of the displaced population in Metuge, Ancuabe, Montepuez and Chiure does not seem to have been very wise, as these are highly populated areas, with little fertile land for cultivation and, in some cases, very close to the conflict zones. On the contrary, the fertile lands of Balama or Namuno have only received a few displaced communities.

Interviews also indicate that, in addition to the difficulties of access to land, demographic pressure in some areas is also depleting fishery resources, and the livelihoods of many families are also being severely diminished. Many of the displaced fishing communities are finding it very difficult to continue their activity or to start other livelihoods.

BLOCK 3. WATER, HOUSING, HEALTH AND EDUCATION: Lack of water supply, precarious housing and

More than
40% of the
population does
not have access
to adequate water
supply facilities

limited access to health and
education services.

Water

Low rates of access to sufficient quantity and quality of water, sanitation and hygiene resources has always been a major challenge in the area. More than 40% of the population does not have access to adequate water supply facilities, and only a quarter of the population has improved sanitation facilities. Fifteen percent still practice open defecation. These proportions are similar in the displacement centers, and while progress has been made in access to improved latrines, much remains to be done, particularly in access to hygiene products¹⁰.

Even in cases where they have access to water, this access is subject to different problems. Families interviewed at the Natove center in Ancuabe and Mapupulo in Montepuez report insufficient and poor-quality water. Although there are water supply tanks, they do not usually refill them continuously. Most of the time they

10. WSC (2022): Overview-WSC Light. Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique. Wash Severity Classification, January 2022
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/REACH_GLO_Mozambique_WASH-Severity-Classification-WSC_Light-Report_January-2022_0.pdf

have to fetch water from wells and rivers. The women are in charge of fetching water for the whole family. When they go to the tanks they are given a password that they present every time they go to fetch water. They make a journey of about 20 minutes. One of the main difficulties is the queues, which sometimes cause some conflicts that are resolved through the Center's administrators. When they have to go to the river, in general, they indicate that the journey is smooth, except that the road to get there is not good and they have to make a long trip every day (it can be 2 hours round trip). On average they need and get 80 liters per day. Water, they say, is enough, although it depends on the number of people in the family. In general, they get the amount of liters they need because they make as many trips as necessary to do so, or several people from the same family go in search of water. They do not say much about the quality of the water because, they say, their priority is to have it.

In the city of Pemba (Mahate) there are usually taps in the courtyards. Depending on consumption, families have to pay between 500 and 1000 MZN per month (about 7 to 10 \$). In the neighborhood of Josina Machel they have to rely on water from tankers and trucks. It is mostly women who do this work. The difficulties are the lines that

sometimes bring as an added problem small conflicts that are solved in a simple way. The journey does not take them long (maximum half an hour). However, they do not always get the liters they really need and, given this insufficiency, they have to buy water in the neighborhood where they are charged around 10 MZN for 80 liters (0.15 \$).

Housing

More than 80% of displaced persons are housed in overcrowded accommodation in the homes of relatives and acquaintances in host communities, with the remainder living in overcrowded collective sites with little privacy. Since the articulation of the shelter cluster and the increased coordination and camp management there have been some improvements in aid coordination and, above all, in the speed of assistance with the new influx of displaced persons and families¹¹.

However, housing assistance remains very deficient as evidenced by the lack of attention to host families and the unhealthy situation in which many of them live. Most of the temporary centers (planned to host families for a maximum period of 6 months)

11. IOM (2021): Crisis in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique Situation. Report 1-16 June 2021, https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1486/files/situation_reports/file/iom_mozambique-cabo_delgado_crisis_sitrep1-16june2021.pdf

are still open after two years without any additional housing assistance. There are also difficulties in meeting the shelter needs of returning families. Gaps include: the construction of emergency housing for families who are rehoused in resettlement centers and therefore have a more permanent status; as well as the lack of adaptation of housing assistance to special contexts of families in a state of vulnerability (unaccompanied elderly, single mothers who are heads of households, people with functional diversity, victims of sexual violence...). The standardization of response measures in the area of housing generates many problems and does not cover many of the main needs of assisted families.

Among the families interviewed, some have been able to build their own house with their own funds and labor. Some bought the land, in another case, a relative gave them a plot of land, and the other two relocated families have benefited from a government allocation where they have been able to build temporary shelters. In general, the houses are small for the size of the family units. The average number of persons per family aggregate in the rural context of the displacement centers is 5 persons, and most of the emergency shelters are between 7 and 9 m² in size. Resettlement centers try to

find solutions a little more adapted to each family unit, so they usually measure up to 16m², corresponding between 1 and 1.5m² to each individual. Under the Sphere standards of humanitarian aid¹², a minimum of 3.5m² per person is stipulated, excluding cooking space, bathing area and sanitation facilities. Similarly, most emergency shelters do not have interior partitions, being composed of a single space, and do not have doors or other measures to improve safety inside the shelters. This interior configuration conditions the traditional concepts of privacy.

Almost all the families aspire to improve their housing. In the case of the families living in Pemba, they reside in borrowed houses, crowded together with host families, and others have managed to rent small houses. Those who have managed to become independent place a high value on privacy. Those who still live with their host families point to the difficulties of living together and tensions at home that increase with the passage of time. International assistance in terms of shelter is concentrated in the reception centers, although it is also very limited. It should also be noted that local

12. Sphere Association. Sphere Handbook (2018): Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, Fourth Edition, Geneva, Switzerland. www.spherestandards.org/handbook

administrations and governments do not provide housing assistance in the cities.

Health

In terms of access to health care, 80% of the health centers in the nine most conflict-affected districts of northern Cabo Delgado are not functioning. The already fragile health infrastructure has been further weakened as a result of the armed conflict¹³. In the districts most affected by violence, there is no health care other than that provided by government and international organizations' mobile units, focused on combating diseases such as acute watery diarrhea, cholera and Covid-19. Efforts are also being made to locate displaced people with chronic diseases (HIV and tuberculosis) for referral to local health centers, as well as to mobilize mental health and psychosocial support resources to deal with the trauma of war. Among health personnel, there is some concern about the intrusion of traditional healers who deal with health problems, and whose knowledge is not sufficient to treat illnesses that, from a formal medical perspective, are easily treatable.

13. ICRC, 2021. Mozambique: ICRC director of operational activities says public health is threatened in Cabo Delgado due to the combined effects of conflict and extreme weather, <https://www.icrc.org/es/document/mozambique-el-director-de-actividades-operacionales-del-cicr-afirma-que-la-salud-publica-se>.

For their part, the families interviewed complain about the lack of medical care and the prices they must pay for consultations and medicines. Although they try to go to health centers and hospitals, they end up resorting to traditional medicine, as they trust and are knowledgeable about traditional medicines to cure the most common ailments. However, displaced people in the city have more difficulties in accessing these types of medicines, so they have to buy them. In general, they usually go to the doctor, although some families report that sometimes they also resort to healers to treat fevers, headaches, stomach and eye pains, as well as to deal with envy and evil spirits (madjini).

Education

Schools have been severely affected by insecurity in Cabo Delgado. According to the education cluster, by June 2021, more than 200 schools were affected and 46 had been destroyed¹⁴, impacting tens of thousands of schoolchildren and teachers, which is leading to significant setbacks in

14. Relief Web. Mozambique Response to Insecurity: EIE Coordination Group/Education Cluster Year Overview - Reporting of activities from 1 January 2021 - 30 November 2021 [EN/PT]. <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-response-insecurity-eie-coordination-groupeducation-cluster-year>



basic education in a province that already had very low education indicators. The cluster is trying to respond through distance learning initiatives, learning materials kits, teacher training for the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, psychosocial support for sexually abused girls and children who have been recruited by armed groups, improved water and sanitation facilities in schools... but a more structural strategy to address the shortcomings of schools in the host areas is still lacking.

The families interviewed in the Natove camp report that their children are not attending school and report administrative difficulties. In the Mapupulo camp, they note that the educational situation has improved somewhat, although the children of the families were out of school for between 9 months and two years, so some have decided not to continue with their studies. The children who have settled in Pemba do attend and have facilities to go to school.

BLOCK 4. WOMEN. Violence, discrimination and specific needs of women and girls.

Displaced and host women assume a large part of the daily activities, and their specific needs are often not adequately attended to. Pregnancy and childbirth assistance, given the lack of coverage by health units and medical personnel, although also due to cultural tradition, is usually carried out in the environment. Among the families interviewed, there were several circumstances: a birth that had to be attended by the women accompanying them in the bush during the flight, another birth attended in a hospital by a nurse from one of the families staying in Pemba, and an assistance at home by the grandmother-midwife of another of the displaced families in this city. The report also describes deliveries by the host women and other neighbors in the camps and on the boats from which they fled.

Most families report that they weigh whether the current economic conditions are conducive to having children before making a decision to have children. The decision is usually made by the women or jointly. Sometimes, traditional healers and midwives are used to help prevent pregnancies. During initiation rites, girls are taught how to prevent pregnancy. Adolescent girls are told

to avoid having sex with men, and if any of them become pregnant, families try to get the father to take her away and marry her. Some interviews indicate that there are families that encourage pregnancies among minors in order to alleviate the family burden in this context of humanitarian survival. In addition to the increase in premature pregnancies, there is also mention of the increase in child prostitution due to the growing precariousness of living conditions.

Despite being present in the daily lives of women and their families, women's menstruation is an issue that receives little attention. None of the women participating in this study felt that the needs of women and girls related to pregnancy, childbirth or menstruation were not being taken into consideration, beyond a punctual and scarce distribution of hygiene kits. As a result, they face many personal hygiene problems and feel discomfort. When menstruating, women use cloths, panties and, those who can afford it, buy sanitary towels. Hygiene kits are sometimes distributed in the camps, although they are insufficient. In the absence of sanitary towels, they resort to washing themselves with capulanas and cloths

fastened with shorts. To resolve this issue, they suggest that, when planning aid, hygiene material should be taken into account so that all women and girls can have access to sanitary towels and cloths as a basic commodity, in addition to food vouchers.


Although there is no concrete data, it is also presumed that there is a growing presence of sexual and physical violence against women. In the case of rape, some families indicate that they would accept their raped family members and subject them to a purification ritual, while others would reject them.

Through the protection cluster, an attempt is being made to address some of these problems. Its work, although limited, has made significant progress. In 2021, thanks in part to the 6 mobile spaces in operation, more than 40,000 women have accessed services for gender-based violence, mental health and psychosocial support, and early marriage prevention programs. The donor community and the government are also dedicating resources to care and to sensitization and training of personnel for GBV prevention and response. However, much remains to be done.

Integration and return processes



It is difficult to speak of lasting solutions in a context of ongoing conflict. Although the military operations have managed to recover the main places occupied by the insurgency in the central and northern regions, they have not succeeded in putting an end to the attacks, so that the number of victims and displaced persons is gradually increasing, with a drift towards the southern region of the province of Cabo Delgado and the north of the province of Nampula.



Humanitarian aid is being maintained, while the situation of uncertainty continues, with no clear solutions either on the return or on the implementation of policies and programs that favor the sustainable settlement of displaced families in the places of reception. This chapter systematizes the perceptions and expectations about humanitarian aid, return and coexistence from the perspective of displaced families.

The perception of humanitarian aid

Knowledge of the support systems for the displaced population on the part of the government, the United Nations and NGOs is high, although there are notable differences between families in temporary shelters and settlements and those in the city hosted by family and friends. In the reception camps, the existing humanitarian aid mechanisms are better known than in the cities, where the information does not seem to reach them clearly. There is also a certain perception that aid in the reception centers is more extensive and constant than in Pemba, where it is more intermittent and often does not reach those it is meant to reach.

Immediate humanitarian care, i.e. that which is provided in the first 48 hours after displacement, is mainly provided by host families who assist them in a supportive manner in these situations of extreme

vulnerability. They offer them shelter and food. As the days go by, and during the first three months, the families, although not all of them, basically receive food from humanitarian organizations, either through direct food distribution or by means of exchange vouchers. Those in camps usually have somewhat more support. In addition to food, they have received hoes, machetes, seeds, hygiene and cooking materials, and blankets. In the city, food aid only arrives during the first months, while in the camps it lasts longer than 6 months, and there have even been families who have benefited from programs that provide land for cultivation and space and materials to build their houses.

In general, they appreciate the assistance they receive, but agree that it is insufficient, not diversified and does not benefit all displaced persons. The amount of food they receive is not enough for everyone in the family, it is distributed in an intercalary manner and runs out before time.

There are also some misgivings among the camps, as there is a perception that in some camps the food runs out sooner than in others. Difficulties in access to land and livelihoods, as well as uncertainty about their future, stand out.

Displaced persons are not aware that they have rights as a displaced population. On the other hand, none of the people participating

Displaced persons are not aware that they have rights as a displaced population.

in the study have been able to play a leadership role within the host community. Sometimes it is due to lack of opportunities, since in some cases they have tried, but have not been chosen. Other times it has been due to lack of time, as most people are focused on their survival and that of their families.

Scarcity of food resources and limited access to land to grow crops;

Lack of employment and income to purchase food;

The insufficient housing response and the precariousness of the camps;

Lack of access to drinking water, latrines, and other basic necessities;

The inability of health and education services to serve the entire population;

The shortage of medicines to combat malaria, cholera, HIV and COVID-19 and the few mobile health units;

Lack of advice on administrative procedures, which implies difficulties in accessing the few existing services;

Cuts by humanitarian agencies in the food aid received, which pushes families to survival practices;

Corruption in the distribution of food, shelter and job offers;

The existence of families excluded on the basis of geographic origin or partisan affiliation from the distribution lists;

Lack of attention to the safety of women and adolescents who suffer sexual violence, kidnapping by armed groups, intimate partner violence, early marriage, sexual exploitation and survival sex, and who cannot be adequately addressed by humanitarian action;

The few initiatives to address the traumas of war.

Table 1: Perception of Humanitarian Aid .



The following table presents complaints and demands of affected families that have been collected in different UN reports (CCCM, 2021-Dec) and NGOs:

The return

The families interviewed miss their homes and their villages, and are worried about the impossibility of continuing with their life projects. They lament the lack of information about their lost or kidnapped relatives, and say they feel sad and traumatized. Although they emphasize the experiences of solidarity they have received, they also feel dependent, discriminated against and marginalized by local communities.

The future is uncertain. Given the instability of the situation, they have decided not to return for the time being. Because "they do not feel safe there", for "fear of what they experienced there". However, most are emphatic in pointing out that if the war ends they want to return. "They miss their land." "They lived better there." "There they did not

lack food (...) They had their own houses (...) They had their own vegetable garden". "Their ancestors are buried there" They want to recover their property and belongings. To develop their professional activities. Now they feel they are in a foreign land and assume that it will be easier to rebuild their lives in their places of origin because there are more means of survival.

Aware that the return will not be easy because of the destruction of their homes, their livelihoods, and the lack of infrastructure and public services, they say that by organizing themselves to claim their rights, with or without the support of the government and social and religious organizations, they will succeed. They will probably have a clash between their expectations and reality, they know that "their life will start from scratch, but they will find a way to rebuild it".

To do so, they say they need support to rehabilitate their homes, have building materials, food and household items, recover vegetable gardens, agricultural inputs,

livestock and fishing areas, access loans to start businesses or acquire agricultural or fishing machinery, as well as emotional support. They dream of returning to "living well", of having security, of recovering everything that was destroyed, of returning to their normal life.

Lack of financial means, fear and trauma, and lack of security conditions (as the insurgency is still active) are the obstacles to return. Most are disoriented and poorly informed. In order to return, they are aware that minimum security conditions are needed, and, in this respect, opinions are very diverse. Some people believe that military operations should be increased to deal with the insurgency, while a minority is in favor of demilitarizing the conflict by removing weapons from the area, including those of the national security forces. Others point out that dialogue with the insurgency could accelerate the end of the war, and that the government should fight its own corruption, invest in infrastructure, health and education, and start looking for ways to achieve peace. In any case, many of

the families are waiting for government instructions to make a decision on their return.

Despite the fact that most families want to return to their land to be able to produce and continue their lives, the lack of clarity about the possibilities of return in the medium to long term does not help either the planning of humanitarian aid or the decisions of displaced families about their future. There are mixed signals about the possibility of their return to their places of origin.

Until now, the attacks continue, although have changed in intensity and have moved to other areas that were previously more or less secure in the province. Sometimes the military authorities announce progress in the security of the northern districts, but other times they clarify that the security conditions are not yet fully achieved and ask the populations for caution and vigilance. Some newspapers report that there are people who have managed to return to their villages to check the state of affairs, but who

decide not to return definitively because they consider that security is not guaranteed, and because they lack the means to start over. These people, generally men, leave their families in safe places, and come and go, demonstrating that return is far from being a regular and definitive process. Public and municipal employees are returning to Mocímboa da Praia, but reconstruction operations of basic infrastructure buildings have hardly begun. There is a lack of housing, basic services, inputs to start farming, and security is still precarious¹.

On the other hand, the Government of Mozambique, through ADIN together with other international actors working in camp coordination and management, has worked on the construction of resettlement centers in Ancuabe, Chiure, Mecufi, Metuge and Montepuez, giving signals to the populations that they should make their lives there and not return. In short, there is no coherent policy in this regard, as there are no clear strategies on the return or resettlement of the affected populations.

The crossroads between return and permanence is thus conditioned by uncertainty about the future. Their sense

of action involves making choices based on an experience of past suffering, a present marked by deprivation and an uncertain future. Choosing a path implies, within this framework, the need to evaluate risks in improbable scenarios such as permanence or return.

Local integration

While some families are more certain about returning when the conditions are right, others seem to be willing to resettle in their new locations. However, they point out that they need more support to be able to continue with their life projects, learn some professions or start up commercial activities or businesses, find employment, and have access to land and housing that will provide them with real opportunities to resettle in a dignified manner.

The families in the Pemba neighborhoods emphasize their dependence on their hosts, and the difficulty in obtaining housing, cultivation space, work, schooling and domestic conflicts with their host families. While the families in the camps are more concerned about the problems of coexistence with the local communities, as they have sometimes been hindered from accessing water wells or opening new vegetable gardens.

1. See: 'Carta de Moçambique 24.05.2022': <https://cartamaz.com/index.php/politica/item/10261-acnur-considera-prematuro-regresso-dos-deslocados-as-suas-aldeias> (Accessed: 27.09.2022)

In practically all cases, they are concerned about the worsening of impoverishment as the situation of displacement is prolonged, highlighting the rejection they are receiving for being displaced persons by some sectors of the population who perceive them as competition in access to basic and social resources and employment, and fear for the conflicts of coexistence that may arise for these reasons. Also of concern is the loss of identity rituals, and the change in cultural practices and the failure of younger generations to learn their mother tongue. Several interviews with local humanitarian professionals emphasize that this loss of identity is linked to the weakening of intra-community ties and solidarity mechanisms. Displacements have contributed to the subversion of local social networks of different nature (social, political and economic), making it necessary to rebuild these networks in new locations, an arduous task because while there are ties that can be rebuilt relatively easily (neighborhood, exchange, friendship), others such as family ties are difficult to rebuild, because they require the implementation of mechanisms such as marriage or offspring whose duration can take long periods of time.

Some families are participating in livelihood skills training. Several women are starting informal commercial activities or engaging in domestic work to obtain some additional

resources for their subsistence. However, they claim that in order to be able to integrate locally in the sites of arrival, it is essential to have support for durable solutions that will allow them to generate their own income and minimize dependence on others, whether from the government, humanitarian organizations, relatives, acquaintances or people of good will.

The Northern Reconstruction Program, led by ADIN together with UNOPS, and other programs of other agencies are launching the first initiatives for the recovery of livelihoods that, if implemented and developed with a vision attentive to the local reality in line with the survival strategies of the affected populations and in an integrated manner, can leverage the livelihoods of both displaced and host communities.


The absence of a formal employment market, the scarce monetization of the economic system, the limited access to productive techniques, technologies and infrastructures, the lack of market connections and the limited access to investment capital are elements that must be taken into account, and pre-established formulas or standard projects must be avoided. Attention to informal mechanisms and local economic realities caused by the context of war and displacement is essential to avoid failure.



Risk and conflict analysis in the processes of reception and integration of displaced communities



The tensions that we collect in this chapter try to synthesize the reflections that have emerged from the listening work with displaced people, from the observations of the local team that established the dialogue with them, from the interviews conducted with several humanitarian and governmental actors in the area, from the literature review, and from many of the discussions of the work developed in the project 'Territories in Conflict' by GgG and CEAP since 2017 in Cabo Delgado and the experience of Ayuda en Acción in the province.



Tension 1. The multiplicity of agendas, programs and projects present in the territory versus the insufficiency and lack of diversification of aid.

In Chapter 1 we pointed out some of the humanitarian aid programs and funds that the multiplicity of humanitarian actors are trying to implement in Cabo Delgado. However, despite the volume of the operation, it is clear that there is not enough operational capacity to reach the entire population, not even the most vulnerable groups. A generalized idea is that the humanitarian aid received is insufficient, that it is not enough for all families.

Differences are perceived between the aid provided in one camp and another, between the aid distributed in the reception centers and that which arrives in the cities, and between the displaced families themselves. The problems of identification of displaced persons, the scarcity of aid, the lack of regularity, the need for supplies other than basic food, are some of the demands made by displaced families.

In addition to the lack of international humanitarian operational capacity, there is the weakness of the state in the north of the country and its inability to respond to the hundreds of thousands of people who depend on the aid of international organizations. According to some of the people interviewed, the latest reforms to decentralize power in Mozambique have generated a certain confusion in the distribution of competencies and, contrary to what was intended, may have had a certain centralizing effect. Efforts are duplicated and there is no clear division of roles between ADIN, under the control of the central government, the reconstruction plans of the provincial and district authorities, the clusters and the operations of the security forces. In international initiatives, competition between UN agencies, and NGOs (de)pending external funding and the strategies of funding organizations, or the existence of other more independent organizations with their own agendas, add to the complexity of the situation.

The coordination effort made by the United Nations agencies through the cluster system, although important, needs greater involvement on the part of the response actors. Difficulties such as language, the regularity and format of the meetings and the limited participation of government entities and local organizations hinder greater alignment. Likewise, some of the

people interviewed pointed out that the agendas that are being configured through the coordination of these humanitarian operation clusters are sometimes distant from the daily realities of the people who are suffering from this situation.

Tension 2. Unique recipes for families in diverse situations.

Humanitarian aid, in kind or in vouchers, is distributed according to the number of members of the family unit, without taking into consideration the type of location of the families (temporary centers, permanent resettlement, host families, etc.), the rural or urban context, the period of stay or even the levels of insecurity caused by the conflict in the various districts. In addition, the identification of beneficiaries and the most vulnerable groups for the distribution of food aid is not proving to be simple, since a large part of the population is in host families, and many people in their flight did not manage to carry their identification documents and property titles.

From the conversations with the families, we observe a generalized provision of aid that reproduces standardized and uniform humanitarian intervention mechanisms that are not capable of addressing the diversity of situations of displaced persons, nor do they

reach all the people who need them. In order to establish criteria for the redistribution of aid, there is no clarity in the identification of the most vulnerable groups of displaced families or host families to support. The criteria vary according to the project and the agendas of the organizations that meet their own diagnoses.

On the other hand, and although this is an issue that would require much more in-depth study, certain differences in the behavior and manner in which displacement has been dealt with, based on cultural and socioeconomic criteria, are described. In the planning of relocations in reception and resettlement centers, it is evident that little consideration has been given to the geographical, social, economic and cultural characteristics of the displaced communities. Insufficient attention has been paid to their rituals and religious worship, and neither ethnic differences nor their worldviews have been taken into consideration to facilitate assistance according to their specific aspirations, traditions and skills.

Similarly, the socioeconomic stratification of families is an element that should be studied more closely, especially when launching new initiatives. In order to make aid more effective, it is very important to take into account the social composition of origin and the capacities of displaced groups, since these are fundamental elements

that are conditioning family responses to displacement and their survival strategies.

The question of effectiveness in adaptation responds to the capacities of displaced persons and the concatenation of circumstances in their displacement, as well as to whether they find a more or less favorable environment for reproducing or extending their traditional ways of life. In order to move towards a more just and egalitarian society and to build new imaginaries, it is important to mitigate and combat ethnic, cultural and/or religious stereotypes and prejudices, and to respect the existing identities that are part of the diversity of Cabo Delgado.

Tension 3. The format of food aid: between the pragmatism of the agencies and the reality of the families

The role played by food aid in meeting the basic nutritional needs and ensuring forms of survival of hundreds of thousands of displaced people in Cabo Delgado is undeniable. The escalation of the war in 2019 that led to an exponential increase in internal displacement led humanitarian organizations to try to provide an immediate response to the food needs of these affected populations, articulating a system of food

distribution and exchange vouchers for their acquisition.

However, this sudden emergency is becoming a complex emergency, prolonged in time. In this sense, there is an opportunity to rethink, reorient and reorganize humanitarian aid, improving some of the negative elements detected, and trying to adapt it to the different realities, giving more prominence to the demands and expectations of the displaced and host communities themselves.

As already noted, food aid is being distributed according to the number of members of the family unit, either in kind or in cash through checks or vouchers, which, together with income from informal trade, temporary jobs or donations from family and friends, are the main sources of income for many of the families displaced by the war.

In several of the interviews conducted with international agency and NGO managers, this model based on cash transfers has been described as unsustainable and a source of dependency. It is noted that serious difficulties are being encountered in raising sufficient funds from major donors to cover financial needs. Specifically, at the beginning of 2021, WFP stated that it was not raising the \$10.5 million per month it needed to provide food assistance to 750,000 people (500,000 displaced people and 250,000

from host communities)¹, and was therefore not meeting its forecasts. As a result, this international agency is being forced to economize, making generalized cuts in food aid, making bi-monthly deliveries or reducing the food or money delivered to households.

To this collection limitation must be added the critical questioning of the effectiveness and improvement of the food assistance of the cash transfer system which, since the mid-2000s, has been advocated by this organization. In several of the interviews with the heads of humanitarian aid and cooperation NGOs, it was stressed that this aid of 3,600 MZN is generating a lot of dependency and passivity among the displaced population, host families, and even among people who are unduly accessing these "exchange vouchers". They point out that this modality discourages entrepreneurship and the search for other livelihoods for displaced persons. Also technical staff of NGOs interviewed point out that this aid modality is affecting community solidarity mechanisms and local resilience capacities such as non-monetary barter systems, exchange of agricultural labor for food (win-win), community loan pools (xitiki) and other solidarity mechanisms.

For displaced people, having cash is important because it allows them to obtain land to cultivate, purchase seeds, hoes and

other agricultural tools, and pay for school. Direct food aid checks hinder these other strategies. This modality of checks and/or direct food aid, apparently controlled by the government and humanitarian agencies, does not address the diversity of situations in which displaced persons live, which hinders their independence and reinforces clientelistic and patrimonialist practices based on the improper management of distribution instruments and mechanisms.

Tension 4. Corruption and local leaderships

Although these irresponsible practices do not occur in all cases, in most of the interviews with community leaders and NGO officials it was pointed out that the distribution of "exchange vouchers" through the system of village and neighborhood chiefs is encouraging roguery, clientelism and corruption, which means that part of the needy population is left without access to food aid. In some cases, it has been insisted that the distribution should be made through the community organizations of the displaced or women's groups themselves, trying to avoid intermediaries.

Corruption in the distribution of aid, discrimination in its reception or abuses by those in charge of distribution vary from city to city and from reception center to reception center. It is in the city of Pemba that these corrupt practices are most

1. See: <https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-provides-food-assistance-four-hundred-thousand-affected-conflict-cabo-delgado-despite>.

frequent. The government, through its own bodies, chooses the neighborhood leaders who will serve as intermediaries with the displaced community. These neighborhood leaders and their structures are often accused of manipulating aid. People complain that some chiefs register their relatives on the lists of displaced persons in their neighborhoods so that they have access to humanitarian aid, to the detriment of the families who should have this right.

It is also reported that these local leaders use the aid products to resell them instead of distributing them for free. Small businesses are identified that appear after the arrival of aid at strategic points in the city, and which people know belong to people linked to these leaders. Also, in these urban areas there are cases of demand for sexual services in exchange for food or other advantages in access to aid. These types of complaints and denunciations were obtained, above all, from informal conversations or the establishment of relationships of trust

with the people interviewed. In short, there is a questioning of the people and entities involved in these operations that may be transferring clientelistic systems to the area of food aid, which is contributing to a growing lack of social cohesion.

Tension 5. Growing rivalries between resident communities and displaced persons.

From the study we were able to confirm, and with greater recurrence as time goes by, that there are problems of coexistence and lack of solidarity between the displaced families themselves and the host communities. In general, displaced families support each other, which translates into food donations, community work, care for children and the elderly, and even loans in modalities such as *xitiki*, generally organized by women.




In rural contexts, the bonds of solidarity and the feeling of community security tend to be stronger than in the city. The homogeneity of geographic, ethnic and/or religious origin in the camps favors interaction and solidarity relations among displaced persons, while in the city there is not so much interrelation.

Even when neighborhood solidarity is valued, several of the displaced people, especially those settled in the neighborhoods of Pemba, complain about the xenophobia received. They perceive that they are discriminated against because of their refugee status, especially because they receive aid that local people do not receive. Although some families try not to react or offer apologies for the conflicts that emerge, others opt for dialogue and understanding with the host communities. Some community leaders of host populations and displaced families are trying to set up community mediation structures.

The truth is that the lack of basic services increased by the war, the limitations of

humanitarian action, poverty and the need for survival are not exclusive to the displaced people, but also the host families and the rest of the Cabo Delgado society suffer from this precariousness, which translates into a breakdown of solidarity, changes in morality, xenophobia, distrust, intolerance, disaffection between cultures, ethnic groups, communities and family groups.

Thus, when the conditions in the sites of arrival are extremely vulnerable not only for the victims of forced displacement, but also for the natives themselves, it is very likely that conflicts will arise around the distribution of aid, and that there will be an instrumentalization of this aid. It is known that one of the material factors that condition conflicts and rivalry between native and displaced communities is associated with checks and access to food. However, there are also disputes over the use of local resources (water, firewood, bamboo, land), as well as over cultural practices (burials, initiation rituals, etc.).



Conclusions and Recommendations



In this final chapter, the discussions discussed in the previous chapters are taken up again to extract the most relevant lessons and, through them, to make some proposals for action that will be drafted in the form of recommendations. It is necessary to understand peace in a plural and culturally contextualized way, to imagine, think and achieve a present and future of peace, starting from the situation of forced displacement, violence and frustration suffered by its protagonists. It is very important to understand the complexity of the aspirations and actions proposed by the communities affected by the war.

Main lessons from the study

Lesson 1. The connections between war, massive internal displacement of populations and geo-economic interests

The connections between the war, the massive displacement of populations, economic interests and the geostrategic importance of Cabo Delgado in terms of legal and illegal trade routes, and the expansion of extractive frontiers cannot be ignored.

Although domestic factors (ethnic, religious, political differences...) may play a role, it cannot be overlooked that these new forms of violence, as in many conflicts around

the world, are often linked to extractivist interests.

The realpolitik of struggles for the control of African energy resources seems to impose itself on the ideals of the defense of human rights, democratic governance, human development and peacebuilding that appear in the declarations and documents of the main international actors.

The war is altering the territorial and demographic organization of Cabo Delgado, causing hundreds of thousands of displaced people to abandon their way of life. It is therefore necessary to consider contemporary political economy when thinking and designing humanitarian support, development and peace policies. Purely ad hoc and domestic solutions have limited impact and often do not result in structural change because they do not take into account broader national and international contexts.

Lesson 2. A welfare model that generates dependencies

Without questioning the good intentions to help displaced populations and host communities, the militaristic approach of the actors who are prioritizing the fight against international jihadist terrorism and the expansion of the Islamic State as the only solution to the war is worrying: an operation with a large multilateral military contingent (armies of SADC and Rwanda supported technically and militarily by the US and the

EU and its member states), complemented by a large humanitarian operation that tries to respond to an emergency that is prolonged over time. Between 2017 and 2021, the international community sent more 915 million €, when Mozambique's annual budget is about 5.5 million € (the part of the state budget not funded by foreign donors¹), which evidences the dependence and the extent of the effective sovereignty of the state.

This humanitarian operation is generating not only dependencies in the Mozambican public authorities, but also in the populations suffering from the conflict, feeding ways of life where people are conditioned by a distributive economic model as opposed to models based on the incentive of productivity through the generation and use of their capacities. The danger of distributive models lies above all in the accumulation of capital by entities that have distributive functions which, in the face of a breakdown in aid flows, condition in different ways the development of productive models at scale. These are approaches that condition the agency of program beneficiaries and neglect local development strategies and agendas. The prioritization of these distributive, paternalistic and technocratic models, focused on alleviating poverty and helping people to reduce their immediate needs, must be combined with a strategy based on systemic assistance and community participation programs that

1. República de Moçambique (2020): 'Proposta do Lei do Orçamento do Estado para 2021', Setembro, Maputo.

strengthen local capacities and transform their living conditions. It is necessary to focus on models based on productivity, adjusted to local and regional social and economic contexts, that promote, strengthen and influence local capacities and potentialities in a framework at different scales, combining the local with the international.

It is time for the actors of this operation in Cabo Delgado to rethink their intervention proposals and deepen their actions to work on the materiality and immateriality of the conditions required for peace and well-being. It is time to work for social justice with employment, rights, education, public services, health, mobility and communication infrastructures, social security, inclusion and protection guarantees, and for cognitive justice, respecting the cultural imaginaries, expectations and aspirations of the communities to advance in the positive transformation of conflicts and substantive equality in this province.

To achieve this, it is necessary to invest in knowledge in order to act, and to have the capacity and flexibility to be able to adapt the best practices of international development, in constant dialogue with the local reality, in order to achieve real effectiveness, understanding and respecting the agency of the people for the sake of greater social justice.

Lesson 3. It is necessary to bet on approaches that question the basis of the current intervention in Cabo Delgado. Is the triple nexus approach being proposed valid?

Sustaining the existing large deployment requires continued and increased multilateral and bilateral funding. The leadership of the UN agencies has facilitated the exchange of information and has advanced the technical planning of the humanitarian operation. However, a joint intervention with the Government, which hardly participates in these coordination spaces, has not been achieved. There is not enough listening among the actors involved in the response, and a competitive model has been installed to obtain resources. Each actor has or generates its own intervention models, which it tries to apply in a given field and does not pay enough attention to the local reality.

In addition, the prolongation of the war and humanitarian needs in constant transformation open a debate on the current model. In Cabo Delgado there are families who have been displaced for three and four years, in contrast with new families who continue to be forced to seek refuge in the face of the continuity of the attacks. This circumstance poses a dilemma as to whether

to continue with a humanitarian operation focused on covering the needs of the most vulnerable groups or to advance in the triple nexus approach, trying to synchronize the reduction of the vulnerabilities of displaced persons, while trying to put an end to the direct violence caused by the insurgency, to start the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado, and to strengthen social cohesion between displaced and host communities.

Humanitarian approaches work to alleviate suffering and save lives, based on principles or norms such as the "sphere" project, or the "do no harm" approach to eliminate the negative effects of aid and contribute to peacebuilding are not enough². Reforms to improve coordination, complementarity, flexibilization, localization, programming and funding of donors and authorities are not enough. The case of Cabo Delgado is an opportunity to overcome palliative approaches focused on mere "protection" and on the vulnerabilities of people affected by this type of war, and to continue deepening a "critical humanitarianism"³, which promotes

2. Pérez de Armiño, Karlos; Zirion, Iker (2010): Humanitarian action as an instrument for peace-building. Potential and critical tools. Workbooks HEGOA, nº 51

3. In this paper she has sought to transcend the classical, denunciation-witness, do no harm approaches, and go beyond the "new humanitarianism" or the "humanitarianism of resilience", stressing the need to reinterpret the principles of humanity, neutrality, independence, humility and impartiality beyond the liberal, compassionate, victimizing and apolitical parameters, to put the focus on the need for decision-making processes to take into account the voices of people in need of protection. See: Ruiz-Giménez Arrieta, Itziar (2017): A critical look at <<humanitarianism>> from post-positivist studies. Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals, nº 117, pp. 173-196; and Hilshort Dorothea (2018): 'Classical humanitarianism and

a more grounded knowledge of reality, which takes into account the experience of affected communities, and which empowers the agency of people and human groups that suffer from this type of war and catastrophes.

The expansion of the conflict to new areas in southern Cabo Delgado and northern Nampula province since May 2022 has altered the geography of the conflict through sporadic attacks on dispersed communities in new locations. This widening of the geographical coverage of the war makes it more necessary than ever to strengthen the response capacities of local authorities and communities in order to be able to respond quickly to sporadic population movements in different parts of the territory. Working on the preparation of the response by the actors and on the resilience of the communities is the backbone of the new forms that the conflict has been taking.

In summary, the current response should pay greater attention to such keys as:

- the trade-offs between the urgency of the response, "do no harm" and "the right to life with dignity";
- the instrumentalization and linkages of aid interventions and the new global geo-economy;

resilience humanitarianism: making sense of two brands of humanitarian action'. Journal of International Humanitarian Action, 3:15.

- the conditioning of humanitarian and peace-building operations by the international agenda of the fight against terrorism and/or migration control;
- the professionalization and technification of operations focused on logistical issues that ignore the social, political, economic, cultural, environmental and gender impacts caused by this type of humanitarian intervention. Operational response practices can no longer relegate local knowledge, daily life and requests to the background;
- and a greater awareness of the benefits and opportunities that the humanitarian aid chain brings to economic and political elites, to the detriment of the people who really need it.

Is it possible to incorporate these keys to the debates on the triple nexus that are opening up in Cabo Delgado? The current debate is marked by a chronified aid operation, which tries to be combined with reconstruction programs and the generation of economic activities for the affected communities, and with incipient local peace-building programs that push institutional decision-makers to reflect on how to combine and articulate the different phases and levels of intervention.

Future debates on the triple nexus in Cabo Delgado should be approached by betting on strategies that overcome the reproduction of poverty, inequality and the dependencies and submissions to which these communities

have historically been subjected. The bet should be for a critical look at the triple nexus, overcoming the idea of recovering the pre-existing system that suffered from huge deficiencies and inequalities that were built on the basis of a slow historical violence. The nexus between humanitarian action, development and peace should be guided by an alternative project that builds a better, fairer and more united society.

It is necessary to continue working on the replacement of the current response model, highly bureaucratized and with high management costs, with one that leaves more room for independent non-governmental organizations that can commit themselves in the long term, that focus their action on accompanying the strengthening of community capacities while maintaining a capacity to respond to situations of acute displacement, and that do not forget that it is precisely these communities and their informal organizations that play the leading role.

Lesson 4. Cabo Delgado women's micro-policies for peace generate transformative processes from within and from the bottom-up, and are key to local feminist empowerment.





We are dealing with a significantly female displaced population, whose experiences, narratives and specific conditions not only cannot be disregarded, but also lead us to consider the adoption of a feminist approach as fundamental. In this regard, it is worth highlighting three issues:

First of all, the importance of the micro-policies of peace led by women in their communities should be emphasized. Although their presence in public spaces is scarce, women, particularly older women, are central in family and community spaces. Beyond the women who gain visibility at international conferences and meetings and who, rather than representing the voices of those other women who cannot speak, often reinforce their silencing and victimization, it is necessary to give prominence to those other real and concrete women, who suffer

deeply, but who also have the capacity to resist and reinvent their lives, and those of their families and communities.

Secondly, it should be noted that in the daily life of the resettlement camps as in the host families, it is women who perform the vast majority of tasks related to the infrastructure of life. The private is political. Women are responsible for the production, preparation and distribution of food, for the search for drinking water, wood and natural medicines, for the cleaning of bodies, houses and clothes, for spaces for socializing, for the care of children and the elderly, for the primary education of their children... These tasks considered private and/or family tasks have a high political value, as they determine the conditions of survival, and are as or more relevant than humanitarian aid itself. Consequently, local, national and

international decisions on humanitarian aid and peace reconstruction should take into account these responsibilities, which are thought of as purely domestic, when in fact they are the ones that produce and reproduce the material basis of life and the social fabric.

A third and final element is related to the sexual division of labor. Western feminisms have usually considered work in the home to be one of the most important sources of women's oppression. This issue is being nuanced by black and decolonial feminisms, which start from the idea that there are other ways of organizing the home and communities.

It has been observed that some domestic tasks, such as, for example, the management of medicinal plants, the procurement of additional food through work in the vegetable gardens, the management of granaries and pantries, the way of living maternity and relationships with men... give women decision-making capacity, recognition and authority. Without pretending to romanticize the work overload of these women, the fact is that, in peasant economies, with low levels of monetarization and circularity, there are different conceptions of the sexual division of labor from those defended by Western feminisms. Humanitarian aid and work with women from feminist and development organizations, without falling into idealizations, must try to understand these other worldviews and social practices by actively listening to women and girls

and their aspirations for dignity and empowerment.

Lesson 5. One size doesn't fit all. It is necessary to think and prepare different modalities of reception and humanitarian care and to generate options that do not turn people into chronic dependents ⁴.

It must be said that humanitarian action in this war, and the incipient interventions for reconstruction and social cohesion in Cabo Delgado, should take much more into account the complexity of the different realities experienced by displaced families and the population that hosts them, and address these humanitarian, development and peace-building challenges from the needs, potential and local collective capacities.

Families who arrived in the homes of relatives and received little or no support are not the same as those who have settled in shelters. The type of conflicts, tensions and difficulties vary from one family to another. The possibilities of gaining autonomy are also different. However, the common denominator in all of them is the need for support not only in the first days and months, but also in the longer term, and beyond food and basic assistance products.

4. To paraphrase one of the interviewees.

Families who arrived in the homes of relatives and received little or no support are not the same as those who have settled in shelters

It is clear that responses to food insecurity, shelter needs, access to basic health and education services, and gender-based violence prevention require an effort to delve deeper into the particularities of the different realities. This differentiation must take into account whether the place of reception is in the city or in the countryside, whether one lives in Pemba or in its periphery, whether it is a situation of prolonged or shorter displacement and the intention to return, whether one is young or old, whether one is a woman or a man, as well as the historical cultural background of communities still so marked by ethno-linguistic diversity such as those of Cabo Delgado.

These differential elements should be considered with greater attention when intervening with both the displaced and the host population.

Lesson 6. Relying on responsible leadership in communities of displaced persons: legitimacy, authority and social cohesion

It is important to try to identify the different types of leadership present, their role in community life and their function in social cohesion. In previous sections it has been seen that the intermediation of many of the neighborhood and village chiefs is being questioned by the displaced communities who are demanding a greater role for their



leaders, local and religious authorities from their places of origin, and who are also displaced.

In addition to maintaining cultural and religious rituals, where these leaders have been preserved within displaced communities, greater social cohesion seems to be achieved. Therefore, humanitarian agencies and development and reconstruction organizations, in addition to working with the formal authorities, should take into account the voices and proposals of religious leaders of different faiths and initiation rituals, midwives, and community mediators who enjoy the legitimacy of their displaced communities when rethinking their interventions and implementing their aid. In any case, it should not be forgotten that some of these leaders can also promote clientelistic networks and corruption, so it is important to articulate collaborations and accompaniment based on co-responsibility.

It is necessary that the communities themselves and their ethnic, religious and partisan power structures, peasant and women's associations, organizations of people displaced by the war and by transnational corporations, activists and academia involved in humanitarian action and peacebuilding, join forces and dialogue in symmetry. The ordinary people of the communities, outside of the classic schemes of associationism, must generate new and better mechanisms for self-organization that favor new projects of coexistence and shared identity, that protect them from armed actors, that overcome victimization and that

are capable of generating spaces for dialogue for peace.

The local narratives, concerns and aspirations of the women and men of Cabo Delgado must be duly addressed. A comprehensive approach is needed, based on a frank, deep, creative and constructive dialogue between the agencies and communities involved in the response. A dialogue that abandons ideological positions and preconceived formulas based on a "new social contract" guided by principles of equity and social justice. It is necessary to go deeper into the reality of the needs, potentials and capacities of the communities of Cabo Delgado.

Lesson 7. An aid to cohesion: networks of solidarity and mutual support

As mentioned above, aid is generating dependencies and is not being able to promote alternatives to the loss of access to traditional resources and the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of displaced people.

The cohabitation of displaced persons and host populations is causing conflicts over resources and services that were already very scarce. The periodicity, access criteria, material contents and cultural appropriateness of the aid are also issues in dispute, both within the family units themselves, as well as between families camped in official centers and families hosted by private individuals, and between

displaced and host communities sharing the same territory.

In addition to taking into account local idiosyncrasies and cultural contexts, assistance that is sensitive to these conflicts and to the improvement of coexistence and social cohesion requires accompanying processes to build collective capacities to improve livelihoods.

The phenomenon of continuous aid is promoting the shift from a productive economy with low returns to a system based on distribution, which in many cases works against the already precarious subsistence systems. Every crisis is an opportunity to build new models of life. Distribution mechanisms must be appropriate to the situation of families, and contribute to the construction of capacities that allow them not only to recover their livelihoods, but also to improve them. For this, in addition to early recovery strategies, a long-term sustainable vision is also necessary to improve the precarious situation at the outset.

It is essential that institutions, both for final resettlement and return, contribute to the generation of life opportunities and the promotion and strengthening of traditional solidarity mechanisms, to the economic empowerment of displaced communities and to a new monetary ethic that promotes a culture of money as an exchange value, and not as a form of accumulation and luxury

spending. The challenge is not simple. We must continue to manage vital material support (food, housing, medicines, tools), but also ensure that this humanitarian aid is a "caring action" that contributes to people's well-being and social cohesion.

Fortunately, the solidarity of host families is still much greater than individualistic, xenophobic or selfish attitudes, and an example of this is the percentage of families living outside the reception centers, with other family aggregates. It is therefore essential to strengthen the various existing community reciprocity mechanisms and to use them creatively and effectively.

Although in the city of Pemba the decline in hospitality and assistance to displaced populations has been highlighted in the testimonies of aid professionals, community leaders and displaced families, other mechanisms of community and inter-family solidarity have also been highlighted.

It is important that agencies in the process of strengthening these mechanisms take into account the principles, values and cultural attitudes and ways of organizing local populations, rather than applying parameters of instrumental rationality. A hermeneutic conception of the process, based on frank dialogue and mutual learning, is more necessary than ever. Making possible new combinations of local practices with innovative mechanisms and experiences from other places and times is

key if the objective is to improve people's lives.

Humanitarian, development and recovery interventions are complex interactions between actors and networks at all levels, different ways of being and acting in the same territory, loaded with cultural, technical and technological legacies, ideologies, experiences, interests and affections that build the response that is being given. It is in the dense description of this phenomenon where we find that no one is the arbiter of truth, that each one acts from his/her own side, and that it is in a horizontal and polyphonic dialogue, where the necessary bridges can be built to reverse the situation, and contribute collaboratively to a better future, which reverses the past situation that led to the conflict, and the present situation marked by the suffering of violence and forced displacement⁵.

Lesson 8. Return and peace as uncertain ideals that require memories of war and innovative peace-building initiatives

5. It is essential to build common positions, a common mode of action based on shared goals and coordinated action techniques. See: Tuomela, Raimo (2010): *Cooperation as a joint action*. Stuttgart: *Analyse and Kritik*, 02, 2010; and Dubois, Alfonso (2019), "The alternative proposal from the capabilities approach. Concepts and framework of analysis", in Jokín Alberdi et al: *Territories in Conflict. Keys for the construction of life alternatives*. Gernika-Lumo: Gernika Gogoratuz. 25-69.

The uncertainty about the return and the end of the war destabilizes the displaced families, who await with attention the indications of the authorities. In addition to the end of the war, the people of Cabo Delgado are concerned about the emptying of the districts, the prolongation of displacement and humanitarian aid, the uncertainty about returning to their places of origin, and the loss of identity, values and knowledge caused by the war.

The fieldwork with the families confirms a dominant idea of the paternalistic State. According to this conception, it is the State's obligation to put an end to the war, support people to restart their lives, rebuild the destroyed infrastructure and develop the province so that there are no longer first and second class Mozambicans. This idea contrasts, but is not incompatible, with a growing distrust of state institutions (Da Silva & Cunha, 2021).

Although many of the families interviewed advocate for an increased presence of international security forces, the increasing expenditure on "anti-terrorist" military operations to maintain peace does not guarantee an end to the conflict and will therefore delay or end the return expectations of many of the displaced communities. It is necessary to complement "militaristic" strategies and invest in memory, dialogue, livelihoods and work to build social cohesion and welfare.



It is very important to work on memory through the oral accounts of the present. It is important to collect the pain, suffering and resistance of these people that cannot be silenced or forgotten forever. There is a work of memory that must be done, which is fundamental to advance in the next steps of dialogue, mediation and social cohesion. The key lies in understanding the past as seen from the present and how it conditions visions of the future. The recovery approach, which takes the past as the future, romanticizing it through memory games, must be altered. In a present situation that is more precarious than the previous one, the past is romanticized as a desirable future and, to a lesser extent, as the least bad compared to the present.

Although the past and memory are important starting points for establishing the syntax and semantics of the present, they are not the limits of the world or the future. A social project must be built, capturing the logics and contents of the local immersed in national and international contexts, as levers for a better future. Even in the most traumatic events, those that leave the most helpless people, reactions are built that enhance initiative, creativity and innovation⁶.

Current peace-building initiatives are more focused on strengthening security capacities and preventing jihadism among the youth. In the last two years,

the international community and the government have launched some initiatives aimed at preventing inter-community conflict and generating livelihoods. However, few programs support the mediating and negotiating capacity of interfaith dialogue, community leadership and committed local authorities, which have significant potential to end the direct violence generated by insurgent groups.

Looking to the future, it would be very important to open new spaces for dialogue between displaced communities, civil society organizations, government officials and the international community to articulate a return plan. To this end, it is essential to make the transition from approaches that focus on the vulnerability of the people affected, which in many cases generate dependency and submission, and which are useful in the first instance as mechanisms for rapid response to crises, to approaches where the generation of livelihoods, mutual respect and the assurance that all voices are heard, and that community knowledge and proposals are taken into account, prevail.

It is time to bet on a local construction for peace based on dialogue, experience and knowledge of the communities of Cabo Delgado, combined with learning from successful experiences in other contexts.

Lesson 9. Demographic and spatial changes in Cabo Delgado: the need for

6. Fernández de Rota, Jose Antonio (1988): "Antropología social y semántica". In Lisón Tolosana, Carmelo (ed.): *Antropología social sin fronteras*. Madrid: Instituto de Sociología Aplicada de Madrid.



an in-depth discussion on the "return" of displaced communities

El territorio y su dinámica espacial están siendo profundamente alterados a causa de la implantación de grandes proyectos extractivos. Desde los Acuerdos de Paz en 1992, las dinámicas territoriales estaban en manos de las comunidades residentes con puntuales intervenciones estatales. A partir de la segunda mitad de la década del 2000 se ha alterado el mapa de ocupación de tierras de la provincia de Cabo Delgado, no solo por causa de los grandes proyectos, si no también y, de manera importante,

por las expectativas generadas en relación a la explotación de los recursos naturales (florestas, yacimientos minerales, uso de infraestructuras productivas, zonas de especial interés turístico y paisajístico, conservación del medio natural, entre otros usos).

Esta reorganización del uso y de la titularidad del suelo y de sus recursos, a pesar de las cautelas tomadas en los instrumentos que lo regulan, requiere una visión espacial más acorde con el futuro de la gente. Esta cuestión de la reorganización territorial no ha sido debidamente integrada en las estrategias de desarrollo para Cabo Delgado. Se ha apostado por

un planeamiento que respondiese a las necesidades de crecimiento económico del país, sin poner un acento suficiente en el bienestar de la población como primera de las prioridades.

La guerra ha traído también cambios demográficos que dificultan plantear alternativas al desarrollismo dominante. Se ha producido un vaciamiento del territorio, especialmente en los distritos afectados por la guerra, a través del desplazamiento interno de la población. La prolongación en el tiempo de esta situación de cientos de miles de personas, la urgencia de continuar con la vida y construir contextos de supervivencia y normalización de la vida cotidiana, las altas tasas de natalidad y la baja esperanza de vida que propician un rápido recambio generacional, dejan el terreno abonado para perpetuar este modelo.

Los responsables gubernamentales, las organizaciones internacionales y la comunidad científica deberían de prestar más atención a las incertidumbres sobre el regreso a sus lugares de origen, a las reacciones de las generaciones de jóvenes que crecen y se relacionan lejos de los pueblos de sus progenitoras/es, y a la desesperación de la gente mayor que teme perder sus recuerdos y conocimientos.

Recommendations

for moving towards change

Based on the lessons learned from this analysis, a series of recommendations are made below that underline the need to deepen in a systemic way the knowledge and local context to plan future actions and interventions, emphasizing the participation and protagonism of the visions and daily life of the local actors.

These recommendations and suggestions have been divided into two blocks: the first more related to the need to transform the response model and the triple nexus for this territory; and the second with concrete proposals for community intervention and the strengthening of collective agency.

On the intervention model and the triple nexus in Cabo Delgado:

Several of the lessons learned suggest the need for an epistemological shift away from conventional theoretical, analytical and methodological approaches to humanitarian action, development and peace. The current agenda that attempts to respond to this type of war partially responds to the vital needs of the affected populations, and does not sufficiently take into account their knowledge, expectations and aspirations.

The war and humanitarian crisis in Cabo Delgado can be an opportunity to put into practice new contributions from critical approaches to political economy, local sustainable human development, peace and conflict transformation that move towards more transformative humanitarian action and international cooperation for development and peacebuilding.

In relation to this proposal to transform the response model in Cabo Delgado, the following actions are proposed:

1 Create a research-action-participation laboratory on the Triple Nexus, with the purpose of advancing in concepts and contents, in understanding its limitations and in providing new tools for analysis and intervention to the staff of national and international agencies and organizations and to local leaders. Some issues that can be analyzed are: 1) the identification of the different actors involved in the triple nexus; 2) the coordination between the different actors of the triple nexus; 3) the identification of adapted tools to operationalize the triple nexus in order to guarantee short-, medium- and long-term interventions in the same geographical area.

2 Organize a Conference on humanitarian action, development cooperation and peacebuilding in Cabo Delgado, where, from a

critical perspective, concepts, keys and strategies of both the main national and international actors present in the territory and the local communities will be discussed. The organization and preparation of this event should be articulated from a process of citizen participation, and one of the final results of the conference could be a "white book" on concrete actions to be carried out in the framework of the triple nexus in Cabo Delgado in harmony with the policies, plans and strategies of the partners involved.

3 Conceive and design a training plan aimed at the technical staff of agencies, non-governmental organizations, leaders and local associations working with displaced and conflict-affected populations. This training plan should include the elaboration and design of popular education tools and training courses for trainers based on collaborative and participatory action-research (PAR) methodologies that deepen the current diagnoses and contextualizations elaborated so far, and their classic methods of scientific knowledge.

Concrete suggestions for interventions

Throughout the text, some questions have been highlighted that need to be answered and that have to do with the existing needs, the local social, political and economic context and the impact of the interventions



in different areas. Based on this analysis, some concrete and systemic proposals are then made, which are the result not only of this analysis but also of the dialogues held in recent years, especially in the last few months as a result of this work.

4 Advocate for integrated, systemic and localized analysis and response to response gaps. National response systems in Mozambique are in the process of being built, associated with institutional fragility, lack of coverage and low technical and economic capacities. It is necessary to make an effort to generate this capacity at different levels of the territorial scale in terms of goods, infrastructure and services as well as human capacity. It is also necessary to take advantage of the niche of opportunity that international aid offers, but in a rational, effective and creative manner, so as not to generate structures and schemes that increase the tension and support capacity of both the State budget from a resource rationality approach, and of the community structures, from a sequential

vision that allows covering immediate gaps, responding to their future scalability and associated to sustainability plans.

5 Turn response and recovery gaps and strategies into income-generating opportunities for displaced and host communities. Aid volumes are an important resource mobilization niche for communities and economic actors. Analyzing niche opportunities and their value chains, as well as introducing programs to integrate local people and businesses into production, marketing and/or distribution chains, can be an important step towards increasing wealth and redistributing benefits. Such opportunities can be fundamental at different levels and in economies of scale. Some sectors that can be promoted, considering existing needs, are:

- Food, through the promotion of small-scale agriculture, fishing and livestock, to encourage both food and trade of such products on a small scale.

- The promotion of agricultural production for marketing and increasing the income of both families and small and medium production enterprises.
- Conservation and marketing systems for agricultural and fishery products.
- Local production of essential goods for life, such as hygiene products, clothing, soap, among others, which can generate income for producers and meet the most pressing needs.
- Trade by way of improving its permeability and penetration at different levels, including small-scale trade in basic goods in the communities and improving the quality and management of traders in order to be able to supply products in the distribution chains sponsored by the response agents.
- Promoting the provision of basic local services in sectors such as housing, food processing and treatment, repair

services for water systems, means of communication and transportation.

- Training in arts and crafts in order to leverage skills and respond to current and future real demand, taking into account the labor absorption limitations of formal employment in the region.

6 Strengthen early response systems to forced population movements. In the current context of uncertainty regarding the geographic expansion of armed violence, increasing resilience and response capacity at the community, government and civil society levels is a fundamental element. The occurrence of violent and climatic events throughout the provincial territory and in neighboring regions, as well as the typology of the attacks (small-scale incidents, but with significant impacts on the mobility of populations) favor the fact that they can be reproduced constantly and in different parts of the territory. In some cases, these movements are of short duration, but in others, they may already be definitive. It



is essential to take care to generate rapid response strategies and mechanisms to respond to these temporary movements, promoting and strengthening community response capacities on how to operate in these situations and mechanisms for their reception at points of concentration and immediate attention by administrations and response agents.

7 Strengthen instruments, mechanisms and tools for coexistence between displaced communities and host communities to mitigate the risks of conflict. Coexistence is a fundamental element for the construction of peace and social cohesion. In a context marked by poverty and inequality, with historical and profound difficulties in access to resources and essential goods and services for life, conflicts over access to them are commonplace. It is necessary to invest in dialogue mechanisms and community work strategies in order to mitigate these inequalities.

8 Articulate a line of research-action work on memory and local peacebuilding with a situated, participatory, feminist and decolonial methodology. The costly military operations for peacekeeping are not contributing beyond the containment of direct violence in the affected areas, so it

is necessary to open other ways to advance in the negotiated end of this armed conflict, and work on local peacebuilding. Community proposals for dialogue negotiation to end the conflict, the construction of a shared memory and the clarification of the truth, the articulation of peaceful coexistence, social cohesion and a sustained culture for peace in Cabo Delgado should be on the agenda.

Some concrete proposals for action in this line of work would be: strengthen and implement community mediations and inter-religious, inter-ethnic and multi-actor dialogues to advance in ending the armed conflict; develop reflective processes and proposals for peace through community seedbeds or forums, with the effective participation of young people and women; favor conversations with other community networks and social movements from other parts of the world that have experience in local peace-building; implement training or formative processes and community empowerment on peace issues; articulate proactive and proactive conversations to agree on an action plan for peace defined by the social and community organizations of Cabo Delgado. It is essential that the international community and national authorities pay due attention to these other formulas to achieve peace in Cabo Delgado.

